

[H.A.S.C. No. 110-80]

HEARING ON H.R. 3087, TO REQUIRE THE PRESIDENT, IN COORDINATION WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND OTHER SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS, TO DEVELOP AND TRANSMIT TO CONGRESS A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR THE REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN IRAQ; AND H.R. 3159, TO MANDATE MINIMUM PERIODS OF REST AND RECUPERATION FOR UNITS AND MEMBERS OF THE REGULAR AND RESERVE COMPONENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES BETWEEN DEPLOYMENTS FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM OR OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

	Page
HEARING:	
Friday, July 27, 2007, Hearing on H.R. 3087, To Require the President, in Coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Other Senior Military Leaders, to Develop and Transmit to Congress a Comprehensive Strategy for the Redeployment of United States Armed Forces in Iraq; and H.R. 3159, To Mandate Minimum Periods of Rest and Recuperation for Units and Members of the Regular and Reserve Components of the Armed Forces Between Deployments for Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom	1
APPENDIX:	
Friday, July 27, 2007	45

FRIDAY, JULY 27, 2007

HEARING ON H.R. 3087, TO REQUIRE THE PRESIDENT, IN COORDINATION WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND OTHER SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS, TO DEVELOP AND TRANSMIT TO CONGRESS A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR THE REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN IRAQ; AND H.R. 3159, TO MANDATE MINIMUM PERIODS OF REST AND RECUPERATION FOR UNITS AND MEMBERS OF THE REGULAR AND RESERVE COMPONENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES BETWEEN DEPLOYMENTS FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM OR OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services	2
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services	1

WITNESSES

Keane, Gen. John M., USA (Ret.), Former Vice Chief of Staff, Department of the Army	4
Korb, Lawrence J., Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress	8

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:	
Korb, Lawrence J.	49
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:	
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 3159 Offered by Mr. Skelton of Missouri	67
H.R. 3087	72

IV

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:	Page
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]	
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:	
Mr. Murphy	79

HEARING ON H.R. 3087, TO REQUIRE THE PRESIDENT, IN COORDINATION WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND OTHER SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS, TO DEVELOP AND TRANSMIT TO CONGRESS A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR THE REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN IRAQ; AND H.R. 3159, TO MANDATE MINIMUM PERIODS OF REST AND RECUPERATION FOR UNITS AND MEMBERS OF THE REGULAR AND RESERVE COMPONENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES BETWEEN DEPLOYMENTS FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM OR OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Friday, July 27, 2007.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:34 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, we will come to order.

I might mention there will be absolutely no demonstrations of any sort tolerated today.

The House Armed Services Committee meets to hold hearings on two bills: H.R. 3159, concerning deployment policy, and H.R. 3087, a bill regarding planning for redeployment of troops from Iraq.

Later, at 1 p.m. today, in this room, our committee will be holding a markup of each of these two bills, so our witnesses' statements will have an immediate impact—something not often seen.

Today, I am pleased to welcome two very familiar faces and old friends coming back to our committee: General John Keane, former vice chief of staff of the Army, and Dr. Larry Korb, currently a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a former assistant secretary of defense.

Gentlemen, we welcome you, and we appreciate your being with us very, very much.

First, an administrative note. I understand that General Keane has to leave at 11:30 a.m., promptly.

Is that correct, General?

General KEANE. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And the staff has to rearrange the room before the markup. And this means that the hearing has to end promptly

at 12 p.m. So I will ask members and witnesses to be as brief as they can. I will keep my opening statement short, and hopefully Mr. Hunter will agree to do that as well.

We are here today, as I mentioned, to consider two bills, two issues.

First, this hearing is an important effort to learn and to understand what the impact is on our troops and their families from frequent and extended deployments. The Department of Defense has established a goal that active-duty servicemembers should be deployed for one year with two years back in home station. The goal for our reservists and guardsmen is five years between deployments.

Unfortunately, the service is not meeting that goal, and the Army is actually deploying soldiers for longer periods than they have back at the home station. This is a troubling sign, since the time back in home station is usually to reset, retrain and re-equip the forces.

It is also having an impact on morale of the troops, as well as their families. Military families don't ask for much, but one thing they do want and need is predictability and stability in the time between deployments. The loss of dwell time back home is increasing the burnout among our troops, as well as their families.

And I look forward to hearing from insights from witnesses on their insights into the impact these deployment lengths are having.

Second, this afternoon the committee will mark up a bill planning for a redeployment from Iraq. And I believe that we have reached a bipartisan agreement on this particular subject which will be discussed at the markup, but I think it is a subject that is well worth exploring.

A redeployment from Iraq whenever it happens will be huge and a complex endeavor, requiring us to move tens of thousands of soldiers and other civilians and their equipment as well as their supplies out of that country.

It will be like moving the entirety of several small cities. And it can only be done well through the exhaustive and detailed planning that has to happen well in advance of any actual redeployment.

We can all think of recent examples where plans by the Department of Defense were either inadequate or wholly lacking. And many observers have blamed Congress for not conducting oversight to ensure that there were effective plans.

Whatever the justice for these comments, I am determined, as I think all members here, that such criticisms not be leveled at us in the future.

So, gentlemen, we thank you again, Mr. Korb, General Keane, for being with us today. And thank you for your contributions to our country as well as your testimony today.

My friend, my colleague, the gentleman from California, Ranking Member Mr. Hunter.

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, thank you and good morning.

And good morning to our witnesses. We appreciate both you gentlemen for your longstanding service to the country and to this committee, particularly with your insights in important areas. This is one of those times when we need those insights.

This morning, the committee is going to benefit from your testimony with respect to a couple of very important issues that we are going to be discussing and marking up, as I understand, this afternoon.

One would impose statutory requirements regarding periods of rest and recuperation for Armed Forces units that deploy in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. And one would require the President to provide Congress with a comprehensive strategy for the redeployment of the Armed Forces from Iraq.

To be honest, I have got concerns about both of these legislative initiatives. And I hope that you can help us better understand their implications on our national security interests, on U.S. military personnel and readiness, on Iraq and on the broader Middle East region.

H.R. 3159, as well the substitute to it that will be offered by Chairman Skelton today, would prohibit the deployment of active and reserve component units that did not meet certain minimum stand down or dwell time requirements between deployments.

I believe that such prohibitions intrude heavily and inappropriately into the constitutional duties of the President as Commander in Chief.

Beyond that, both dwell time proposals appear to be not so much efforts to improve the readiness of units and quality of life of members of the Armed Forces, but rather to force a withdrawal and reduction of U.S. forces committed to Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

I say that because the structure of Chairman Skelton's substitute would focus deployment prohibitions on Iraq. As I understand it, his substitute would prohibit the deployment to Iraq of certain forces which did not meet certain dwell time minimums, but allow those very same forces, regardless of dwell time, to be committed to combat in Afghanistan or anywhere else in the world that they might be needed.

Moreover, I am concerned that by statutorily reducing the pool of forces available for deployment, essentially putting brigades and battalions on the shelf, so to speak, either H.R. 3159 or the proposed substitute will have the actual effect of increasing the stress on the readiness, personnel tempo and deployment tempo of the units that remained available to meet combatant commander requirements.

It may also put forces deployed in-theater at increased risk if the Army and Marine Corps, for example, cannot meet these requirements.

And, further, it may create a requirement to extend committed forces in-theater. So I will be very interested in your comments on those issues.

The other piece of legislation, H.R. 3087, would require the President to submit to Congress as a comprehensive strategy for redeploying our troops from Iraq, including a plan to achieve "the transition of United States combat forces," and to limit U.S. military

missions to a handful of vaguely worded tasks that include supporting Iraqi forces and protecting Armed Forces facilities.

In my view, this language also crosses the well-defined line established by our Constitution. We have heard this statement in relation to withdrawal plans on the floor of the House and in other places, but in light of this legislation, it clearly bears repeating: The President shall be Commander in Chief.

It is true that the legislative branch must conduct vigorous oversight over the activities of the executive branch. It is our congressional prerogative to conduct oversight of the Administration, and we do that regularly, oft-times here in this very room.

However, it cannot be our congressional prerogative to limit our Nation's Commander in Chief in such a way that would effectively paralyze our military, remove operational flexibility and impose in statute a rigid set of parameters that our military commanders have not requested and by all accounts don't want.

Let us also seriously consider the message that this legislation sends to our adversaries.

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me for interrupting.

There will be no demonstrations in this room. Next time we see that, out you go.

Pardon me, Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again we are telegraphing intentions by using our legislation forum to define limited military missions and sound the retreat, all before we receive the recommendations and advice of perhaps the most gifted military commander currently in the U.S. Armed Forces. And, of course, that is the Petraeus report that we expect on September 15th.

If we want the Department of Defense to share information at the appropriate classification levels about our contingency planning, let us ask for that. Secretary Gates confirmed yesterday that this planning is ongoing.

Let us get the Department's smart military planners in here, listen to what they have to say and provide feedback. Let us not presume to become 435 commanders in chief.

Mr. HUNTER. Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing. I think it is very timely, very important. And I look forward to a vigorous discussion.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, Mr. Hunter.

Without further ado, we will go to General Keane.

We, again, appreciate your past service and your present service. And thank you for being with us.

Followed by Mr. Larry Korb shortly.

Mr. Keane—General Keane.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN M. KEANE, USA (RET.), FORMER
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

General KEANE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman—Congressman Skelton, and also Mr. Hunter, fellow members of the committee. Thanks for the invitation, even on short notice, to provide testimony to you today. And I will make a brief opening statement, if I may.

I come before you today with 40 years involved in national security, and the last 6-plus years involved in Iraq, from initial planning, the oversight of the invasion, and the last 4 years dealing with the counterinsurgency. One year of that was in uniform and the remaining three years I have been a member of the Secretary of Defense's policy board, and the last six months as an advisor to General Petraeus and General Odierno.

I have been to Iraq, from the outset in 2003 up to the present, many times. And the last five months, two times, for almost two weeks each time. And I leave Thursday for another two weeks.

Let me say from the outset that I understand the frustration of the Members of Congress, because I have been there myself. The fact is, our strategy from 2003 through 2006 failed in Iraq.

It was a short war strategy designed to get a representative democracy as quickly as possible before the political culture was mature enough to support it, and a military strategy designed to train the Iraqi security forces and transition to them as quickly as possible. Nowhere in that strategy was there a plan to defeat the insurgency. Our intention was to leave it to the Iraqis.

The level of violence increased, as we are painfully aware, every single year, despite the progress of a series of national elections in 2005 and the installation of a final and third government in 2006, while the Iraqi security forces made slow, steady and at times uneven progress toward taking over from us.

But as the level of violence continued to escalate and then rage out of control in 2006, it was, in fact, beyond the Iraqi security forces' capacity to cope with it.

As we ended 2006, we were in a real crisis, with violence, particularly in Baghdad, raging out of control, thousands being killed, many more being evicted from homes, schools shut down, markets closed, people afraid to leave their homes, streets deserted, and the government unable to provide services and certainly unable to protect their own people.

This newly installed government was moving ever so predictably to a fractured state in its first year, which would lead to an all-out civil war and then a failed state. Horrific consequences would follow: a serious threat to our national security certainly, with a much larger war in the region, an al Qaeda sanctuary in Iraq, an Iranian hegemony developing in the region.

We, the United States, tried to stop the violence in 2006 with two major operations in Baghdad. Both failed due to a lack of forces, both U.S. and Iraqis.

By the end of summer 2006, it was clear even to the casual observer, that our strategy had failed, that we were in a major crisis, and that many believed we were in a hopeless situation. It was certainly reflected in the November elections that we certainly lacked progress, and we were in trouble.

It was a difficult, complex situation where serious mistakes were made. But in my view, it is far from hopeless.

As I analyzed this, I came to the conclusion that there was only one option that remained that could help stabilize the situation. All other options resulted in a worsening situation. Increasing advisors, having more of them, pulling back to larger bases, pulling our forces or reducing them all led to a worsening situation.

The option to conduct a counteroffensive—which is the appropriate military term for what we are doing—with the appropriate level of forces to do what we had never done before, to control the population and protect it while we aggressively attacked the al Qaeda simultaneously in every major area that they are in—again, something we had never done before.

Underlying this operation was the recognition of some profound truths: number one, that we had the wrong strategy from 2003 to 2006; number two, that we had significantly underestimated the enemy for three-plus years; and number three, that security was a necessary precondition for political progress and any chance at economic development, that without security we could just not make progress.

We had a Presidential decision in January to change the strategy and to conduct a counteroffensive. The operation began in February, and it is now in full stride this month with the arrival of the last forces in June.

The counteroffensive, from its inception, has always been temporary. It is not designed to keep the force levels indefinitely. The time frame is 12 to 18 months, with the intent to stabilize Baghdad, create the conditions to permit movement toward reconciliation, and to buy time for the growth and development of the Iraqi security forces.

The operation is recognized by everyone involved that this is our last effort to attempt to achieve some definable progress and permit political solutions.

It was never intended to be a military solution, but by design to use force to change attitudes and behavior to affect political outcomes, which is the environment that all military operations are conducted.

So where are we? In the six months since the operation began, and the one month since we had all the forces, there is a significant change. First, we are on the offensive, and we have the momentum, which was in the opposite direction in 2006, when the enemy was on the offensive and had all the momentum and we were clearly on the defensive.

Two, security has improved in every neighborhood and district in Baghdad and in the suburbs surrounding Baghdad. I have visited almost every neighborhood in Baghdad more than once. Schools are open. Markets are teeming with people. Most are operating at full capacity; some are returning to it. Cafes, pool halls, coffee houses that I visited are full of people. Government services, albeit some in a limited and uneven fashion, are being applied to the people.

Almost all Iraqis I have spoken to—and there are hundreds across the full socio-economic spectrum, to include Sunnis and Shia—almost to a person believe that security has improved and we do not want the Americans and the Iraqi security forces to leave.

We are now living with the people in Baghdad on a 24/7 experience. Sectarian violence, which is the Sunni-Shia violence, is down significantly from 2006, with June being a one-year low.

U.S. casualties, while initially increasing—which is what you would expect in a counteroffensive; it was true in Inchon in Korea, it was true in the Normandy invasion of World War II, it was true

in the Pacific in World War II, and it was true in the counteroffensives in Vietnam.

But the casualties will come down as the operation progresses and succeeds. And in fact, this month, they are down 30 percent.

There are two more significant changes.

First, the grassroots movement among the Sunnis; the fact that they are rejecting the al Qaeda, that they are willing to fight alongside us against the al Qaeda; and most importantly, seeking reconciliation with the Shia-dominated government.

This is a huge turnaround, which is underappreciated in the United States. This is what we have always wanted, the Sunnis to achieve their political objectives not through armed violence, but through the political process, and it is beginning to happen. As such, Anbar Province is almost secure, a shocking reality given the events in 2006. In Diala, Ninewa, Saladin Province and Babil Province, all have Sunni movements toward reconciliation and rejecting the al Qaeda.

Second, the al Qaeda are on their way to being defeated. Time and time again since January, they have tried to derail this operation with suicide car bombs, as they have just done recently, with the intended purpose to provoke Shia militia, similar to what they succeeded at doing with the Samara Mosque bombings and their assassination squads in 2006. It has failed. The Shia militia are not responding in any way like 2006.

Moreover, al Qaeda has lost its sanctuary in Anbar and is losing it in Diala Province.

A parenthetical statement: The reasons why the Shia militia have not responded are threefold. One is certainly they know that we are protecting the Sunni population, which they killed and evicted from their homes in 2006 as a result of the al Qaeda provocation. They would have to fight through us to get to them. They would lose that fight.

Number two, they know that we are protecting millions of Shia, and the feedback of the Shia militia leaders from the millions of Shia that are being protected is not lost on them, and they do not want to risk that protection. So they stay behind their barricades, and they are not attacking Sunnis. They are attacking us because they want us eventually to leave.

But my point with the al Qaeda is their strategy has failed. The Shia militia are not responding to anything like 2006.

Moreover, the al Qaeda has lost its sanctuary in Anbar and is losing it in Diala Province. They are hurt badly. They are still dangerous, to be sure, but they are very much on the defensive.

Not all is rosy in Iraq, to be sure, and I am not suggesting as such. The Shia militia are attacking U.S. forces, but they are fragmented. Sadr is not the leader he was. Maliki is on public television taking issue with Sadr because he knows that Sadr and he are not aligned in terms of their political objectives for Iraq. Sadr is back in Iran depressed and frustrated with what has been happening in Iraq.

The cumulative effect of increased security over a series of months, not days and weeks, has the very real prospects for the beginning of favorable political reconciliation between the Shia and Sunnis. The truth is it has already begun, initiated by the Sunnis,

and in time, in my judgment, will be followed by Iraqi government actions.

Your actions here in the Congress appear to be in direct conflict with the realities on the ground, where the trends are up and progress is being made. Your resolution, like so many others proposed, ties the hands of our military commanders and deprives them of the opportunity to use the appropriate level of force for the time that is required to use that force.

Let me just tell you straight out that our troops took this counterinsurgency offensive in stride knowing it would mean more loss of life and more catastrophic injuries.

Their idealism, their courage, I am in awe of. They do not want to die, but they are willing to, and that is what separates them from the rest of the American people. They are willing to give up everything that they care about in life, everything, the opportunity to have a full life, the opportunity to have parents, to be a parent, to have friends in your life, the opportunity to have love in your life, to love and to be loved. They do this out of a profound but simple sense of duty, and they do it for one another.

This, in my judgment, is true honor. This kind of devotion needs to be supported.

Members of Congress, I respect your constitutional obligations, and I took an oath to willingly defend them, but I ask you to fight your demons, to find the courage that our troops display so openly, to deserve their honorable and selfless sacrifice, to not squander their sacrifices and the gains they have made.

This is not about a President. It is not about an Administration. It is not about Democrats and Republicans gaining advantage over each other. This is all about the American people, their security, and as such, our very real national interests in Iraq and the region.

Members of Congress, I ask you to put these well-intentioned, but, in my judgment, senseless and embarrassing resolutions aside. Yes, we have made mistakes, serious ones. This is not the time to give in to our frustrations, to give in to our anger, and to give in to our fears.

I ask you to wait for General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker to have their say here in September and then you decide if you can support the prospects of future success in Iraq.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you so much for your candid statement. We appreciate it very much.

Mr. Korb.

**STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE J. KORB, SENIOR FELLOW,
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS**

Mr. KORB. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Leader Hunter. It is a privilege to be back here before you once again to talk about the two bills that you have before you which, in my view, you must pass as quickly as possible. Let me explain why I think that is so.

First of all, you have the power, and it is very clear if you go back—and the Congressional Research Service has just prepared an analysis of things you have done in the past, whether it is during the war in the Philippines, the Korean War, the Cold War or Central America—you have put restraints on military forces.

For example, during the Korean War, it was the Congress that insisted that people not be sent into that battle unless they had four months of training. Can you imagine that we needed to do that, that the executive would even think about that, and the Congress had to step up? So you have the power to do that.

Similarly, I think in terms of getting the President to prepare a redeployment plan, you need to do that because there is no fallback position. As much as I respect General Keane and some of the things he said, I cannot emphasize this too much: This surge is built on sand. It cannot succeed, and I will explain why it cannot.

But let me talk first about the situation with our troops. What are you asking? You are allowing the Administration to violate its own policies when it comes to deploying troops. When I had the privilege of serving in the Reagan Administration, the idea was that for every month you spent in a combat zone, you would spend two months at home.

You are allowing them one month, and you are also allowing the President to waive it. That is nonsense. The fact of the matter is you are doing what is right for the troops because this Administration will soon be history, but you are going to have to live with that military force, and if you do not act now, it is not going to be in the shape that it needs to be to carry out our security, and I will get into some of those reasons.

Now, if you take a look at what is happening to our readiness—and, again, as much as I respect General Keane, take a look at what other generals have said—General Powell, General McCaffrey, General Abizaid, General Blum, General Odom—about the situation with our Army, okay. It is broken, okay.

General Abizaid put it very well: This Army was not designed for a long war. And I say to those people who want to keep up this surge indefinitely, if you have the courage of your convictions, then call for reinstatement of the draft, because our volunteer Army was not designed, as General Abizaid said, for the long war.

We had a small active-duty Army. The Guard and Reserve was going to be a bridge to conscription. If you want to do that, have the courage of your convictions. If not, then you have to do what Congressman Tanner and Congressman Abercrombie are talking about in terms of preparing a redeployment plan and what Congresswoman Tauscher and Congressman Skelton are talking about in terms of allowing the people to have this time in between deployments.

Not only is it strategic because, because of this surge, you do not have a single brigade of the 82nd Airborne on strategic operational ground reserve left in this country. We have other interests. Our objective is not “whatever it might mean to win the war in Iraq,” but to provide for the overall security of the United States.

Not only do you have to worry about military readiness, but what about your moral obligation to the men and women who volunteer to serve? When they volunteer, we have certain understandings in terms of how long you will be mobilized if you are in the Guard and Teserve and how much time you will get between deployments.

And if you look at every poll, whether it is conducted by the Army Times, whether it is conducted by CBS, the support among the troops for this ill-considered war is declining, and if you do not

believe the polls, look at the suicide rate, look at the desertion rate, look at the divorce rate. This is what is happening.

Look at what is happening to recruiting because American people have turned away from this war, and they are discouraging—as we call them, the influencers—the men and women who ordinarily would be attracted to join the Army from coming in.

Last year, the Army increased its age for first-time enlistees to 42. It took the number of non-high school graduates to about 20 percent. It tripled the number of people scoring below average on the Armed Forces qualification test.

And what happened? Even with that, it had to give over 8,000 moral waivers—8,000. That is 10 percent for the active force. This year, the Army is not meeting its recruiting goals, and those waivers are up to 12 percent.

You have taken in, last year, 900 people with felony convictions. That is the Army that will be left when this Administration leaves office, and this is the Army you have to deal with.

And they say, “Well, retention is good.” Yes, retention is good among career people, but it is not good among first-term people, people who have not made the career decision. The Army is seven percent short of people completing their first tour.

And what about officers? Retention among West Point people—these are your future leaders—is as low as it has been in the last 30 years. The Army is 50 percent short of senior captains, and the promotion rate from captain to major is almost 100 percent. These are going to be our future leaders. This is the Army that we are dealing with if we do not do something.

Now we have done studies at the Center for American Progress in terms of the deployment of active-duty brigades and enhanced brigades in the Guard, and if you take a look at those numbers, they are startling. You have two brigades on their fourth deployment. You have nine on their third deployment. Twenty have been deployed twice.

The four Guard brigades that have been alerted and are scheduled to deploy to support this surge are not ready because they do not have the equipment to get themselves ready, and all of them are being sent back without the minimum of three years at home.

The governor of Ohio asked the President, “Before you call them up, you certify that this is ready to go.” He has not done it. So this is basically, you know, what the situation is.

I remember when I got off active duty and went back to graduate school and was writing about how did we get ourselves involved in this mess in Vietnam, and I remember interviewing General Maxwell Taylor and then later on, he said, “We sent the Army to Vietnam to save Vietnam. We took it out to save the Army.” And this is the situation you are now in in Iraq.

Now let me conclude by talking a little bit about the surge. The surge was premised on the fact that if you got security under control, the Iraqi government would make the painful political compromises. That is not why they are not making them. They do not want to. They do not have the capacity to do that.

Remember that Maliki promised four months after the 2005 election he would amend the constitution. They have not done it. You

take a look at those 18 benchmarks the last time. Even though they claimed progress on a couple, they simply were not true.

The other premise is that the Iraqi security forces, if we gave them time, would be ready to do what they need. Nonsense. They have had enough training. The question is motivation for these Iraqi forces. There is no Iraq for them to fight and die for.

If you take a look in Baquba, we asked for 11,500 Iraqis to come; 1,500 showed up. They are loyal to their tribe or sect, not to the country. Many of them have more training than young men and young women we are sending over there as part of brigades.

If you take a look at one of the brigades of the 3rd Infantry Division from Fort Stewart, what happened was 140 people joined that unit right out of basic training, missed the unit training, got 10 days of deployment before they were sent over there. And I have other examples, you know, in my testimony.

Why did they fight and die for us? Because they have a country, they are loyal to us. So, with the Iraqis, it is not training. They have the training. The real question is motivation.

The other is that we did not send enough troops. If you read General Petraeus' own manual, we do not have enough troops. If you had a couple hundred thousand more troops, you were willing to stay there for 10 years and the Iraqi security forces could step up and these political leaders would do what they need to do, then maybe you would have a chance, but that is not going to be the case.

We have put out a plan at the center called Strategic Reset which says we have to change our policy toward the whole Middle East, and part of it is to set a withdrawal date and undertake a diplomatic surge. Until you set that withdrawal date, the countries in the region, all of whom are involved in Iraq in a non-constructive way, will not get involved constructively, and I am convinced that once you set that withdrawal date, those countries will know that, in fact, it will be their problem as well as our problem, and none of them want to see Iraq become a failed state or a haven or a launching pad for international terrorism that can contain them.

All right. Let me conclude with this. Twenty-five, 26 years ago, this Congress gave me an unprecedented opportunity to deal with the readiness of our Armed Forces, and at that time, it was not good. But because of the support of this committee, Congress and future Congresses, Administration, we were able to rebuild our Armed Forces, particularly the Army, and the Army that we sent into Iraq was probably one of the finest we have ever had, but it is not there now, and the longer you stay, the worse it is going to get.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Korb can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Korb, thank you very much.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Korb, thank you very, very much for—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Point of inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. You bet.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, you are aware and I think most of the members are aware that at least where 3087 is concerned—I am not sure about the other one—it is my intention to offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. I am about ready to mention that.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Oh, okay, because I was hoping——

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. That it might help clarify things.

The CHAIRMAN. I was going to do that.

First, let me mention that because of the time limitations of the witnesses, we hope we can condense our questions as much as possible. There are two substitutes, one on the 3087. A substitute will be offered by Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Turner to that at a later moment, and, hopefully, you have that in front of you. And I have a substitute to 3159. I hope you have a resume of that in front of you. If not, the staff will be glad to get it for you.

I will ask one question, then ask Mr. Hunter to proceed.

I have a serious concern, and that is this thing called readiness. If the future is anything like the past, as sure as God made little green apples, we are going to have military challenges in the future.

Out you go. Out you go. All of you, out.

As sure as God made little green apples, something is going to happen in the future. We do not know what.

The last 30 years, we have had 12 military contingencies, 4 of which have been major in scope, most of which have been unexpected. Mark Twain once said that history does not repeat itself, but it sure rhymes a lot, and we do not know what is around the corner.

And that is the job of this committee. It is the job of Congress to keep the readiness level high. That worries me. That really does. I think it worries every member of this committee, and that is one of the purposes of our meeting today, our hearing today, and the markup this afternoon, to make steps toward having readiness for the future and a higher level of——

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, could I interrupt for a second?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes? I cannot hear you.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, let me interrupt for a second, if I could. Having our guests walk in and out of the door while previous guests are shrieking outside makes it tough for us to hear you, and I think that this is very serious. We need to be able to hear everything you said.

I would request that if folks want to stay in here in the hearing that you keep them in; if they want to go back and forth for breaks, that they stay outside and watch it on television. There is another gentleman just ready to leave right now, and it makes it tough for us to hear you.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a good idea.

If you are going to leave, leave right now or else stay until we have a break or a moment.

Thank you for your suggestion.

Mr. TAYLOR. He just came in. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. We make an exception for North Carolinians.

A few moments ago, I was given a report by Solomon Ortiz, the gentleman from Texas, the subcommittee chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, on the dire straits of part of our military equipment, which goes to the readiness issue, and all of this ties together and is of deep concern to each of us.

So let me ask this one question. Given the short duration of dwell time at home station under the current policy, are units able to train for missions that would be involved in contingencies somewhere else in the world?

General Keane.

General KEANE. In my judgment, they are not. The troops at home station in between deployments to Iraq do essentially two things. One is they are recovering from Iraq or Afghanistan, and that means recovering their equipment, and people are moving out and new people are being assigned, and there is a transition period there, and then they are preparing to go back to Iraq on deployment.

And so I think certainly with the size of the Army and the Marine Corps that it is today, which is far too small, the commitment that we have of about 150,000 to a protracted war that lasts more than a few years certainly adds stress to that force, and it definitely affects the readiness of the force.

I mean, the issue for me underlying what you are saying is that we knew this at the end of the 1990's that these ground forces were too small. We certainly were painfully aware of it as a result of the confrontation that took place with radical Islam and us on 9/11, and until just recently, we have not done much about it, and the fact that finally the President of the United States has authorized an increase will start to relieve some of that pressure.

But, in my judgment, that increase still is not sufficient because you will by definition have to rely still disproportionately on the Guard and Reserves, and I believe we have flat broken the social compact with the Guard and Reserves, and that truly has to be adjusted, and making them more operational, in my view, is not the answer for people who are trying to maintain careers and other professions.

The only answer is to continue to professionalize the active forces and increase their size, and so I do believe that still can be done, and I believe the American people are up to the task, and it can be done within the confines of a volunteer force, and then if it could not be done, to meet our national security objectives, then certainly I would not stand in the way of going back to a draft, but you would have to convince me that the American people and the American youth are not willing to come forward and participate in the Armed Forces, and every indication we have is that they are.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

Mr. Korb.

Mr. KORB. Well, General Pace, in January, conducted a study and basically said we are not prepared to meet other contingencies around the world.

We had a chance to increase the size of the Army right after 9/11. We did not take it. This Congress has been urging the Administration to do it. Finally, they agreed this year. But the Congress has been pressing them to do that.

This is not the time to do it. When you have the majority of the American people having turned against the war, it is going to be very, very difficult to get them to allow their sons and daughters or encourage them particularly to join the Army.

It was a missed opportunity. Right after September 11, you could have done it. We should have been called as a nation to sacrifice. We were not.

I did not support the invasion of Iraq, but you have a President that was determined to go in 2001. He knew it. That was the time for him to expand the size of the Army. He could have done it. Instead, we did not do it.

In fact, it is very interesting. Right before September 11, this Administration was actually considering, under Secretary Rumsfeld, getting rid of two active Army divisions.

So we missed the opportunity. I am afraid it is too late to do it, and my recommendation is now that you have to begin redeploying from Iraq in order to save this Army and not have to go through conscription.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to begin on a happy note here. Our great member, Cathy McMorris Rodgers, is just now rejoining us. This is her first hearing back since adding a member to the family, Cole. So Cole McMorris Rodgers. We want to welcome him, and, Cathy, welcome you back. Congratulations.

[Applause.]

Mr. HUNTER. Gentlemen, thank you for two very good statements, and, you know, I think that your two statements taken together frame this issue fairly effectively.

There are two issues. One is: Is the counteroffensive working? Is it a good mission? Is it the right mission? And do we need to solidly back this mission to its completion? And the second question is: Are the personnel policies that are being proposed by the majority that are manifested in these amendments hurting or damaging that mission? Will they keep us from maintaining the counteroffensive?

And, Mr. Korb, particularly you have gone back and forth in your statements. You have focused on personnel policies, and then you have gone to your criticism of the counteroffensive. You have said it cannot possibly work, it is built on sand.

But I think the question for us is—the first question that I think we have to look at because we need to make a judgment with respect to the counteroffensive which General Petraeus is going to report on on September 15—would the changes in policy that are being recommended by the majority with respect to dwell time damage this mission?

And if it would—and this is clearly a mission that we are embarked upon, which has the support, obviously, of a number of members, does not have the support of other members—I think the threshold question is: Do we support the mission?

So the first question I would ask you, Mr. Korb and General Keane, is: Do you believe that changing these policies, the policies that are manifest with respect to the dwell time that are in the

proposed amendment, would damage the mission or hamper the mission that we have defined as this counteroffensive?

Mr. KORB. No, I do not think so because you give the President the authority to waive it, and I think the key issue here is that he then must tell you and the American people why this is in our vital national interest. So I do not think it will.

The other is everybody agrees, even Secretary Gates, that by next spring, you are not going to have enough troops anyway. So, I mean, that, I think, is another constraint. Even without changing the policies, the agreement is by spring of next year you cannot keep this level of troops there.

Mr. HUNTER. General Keane, what do you think?

General KEANE. Well, absolutely it undermines the mission. I mean, it takes away flexibility. The commander should be given the required force levels for the amount of time that they need to prosecute the mission, and that amount of time has to be determined by conditions on the ground, not by conditions in Washington.

Those conditions on the ground are the enemy, which we are not underestimating as we have done in the past, and we are not letting our arrogance get in the way of it, and, two, the capacity of the Iraqi security forces to participate as good partners with us in the prosecution of the mission.

Now, based on that, the commanders, if they have the right force levels the amount of time that they need it, they have the flexibility to do this.

And we have to be frank about something here. We are fighting a war that is in our Nation's interest. Therefore, the forces that are fighting that war are expected to be strained and stressed. This is a war.

To be able to say to ourselves that the Army and the Marine Corps are stressed and somehow we should not stress and strain them to me makes no sense. This is a war. We are fighting a war. And, therefore, they are going to be stressed and strained, just as they have been in every war that we have fought.

To be quite frank about it, in some of the wars that we have fought in the past, because of the difficulty, complexity and the weapons used, these forces were expended because of our Nation's interest, and that is why our military exists, to defend our Nation's interests.

And, yes, it does cost lives and it is tragic and the human dimension of that is horrific, but they are there to support our Nation's interest, and the stress and the strain of that force is something that we should never be cavalier about, and we should do everything we can with programs and policies to reduce it, but it is a fact of life when you are fighting a war.

We have choices, and I said this to the President back when I was still on active duty when Secretary Rumsfeld asked me to take over the recommendation to him that we would do a one-year rotation, and I said we have choices. We do not have to do a one-year rotation. We can fight this war until its completion, as we have fought most of the wars that we have been involved in, and that would add a different level of stress and strain to the war, I would submit.

It was in our judgment, based on what we knew at the time, that we would do it on a one-year rotation. Little did I know at the time that we had the wrong strategy and we were beginning to embark on a campaign that so significantly underestimated the enemy that by definition we protracted the war unnecessarily.

But, nonetheless, we have choices here, and we have made them, and I cannot for the life of me believe that we would bring an Army home and lose a war because it is under stress and strain.

And this comment about Maxwell Taylor that my colleague here made, he brought the Army home to save it, the Army embarked on a 10- to 15-year psychological and emotional catharsis based on a humiliating defeat in Vietnam. We struggled with everything we had to rebuild that Army out of the ashes of that defeat because the officer corps was intellectually weakened and the very fiber and soul of the Army was hurt significantly by that humiliating defeat. We hardly saved the Army by pulling it out of Vietnam.

Mr. HUNTER. Well, General Keane, just one follow-up on that. Mr. Korb said that the Army is broken, or he cited a statement by one of our generals to the effect that the Army was broken. Do you agree with that?

General KEANE. This statement is one of the most offensive statements we can make, and I would ask the Members of Congress, regardless of how you feel about this counteroffensive, not to use that term. Stop using that term.

These troops in combat know that the majority of the people in the United States do not agree with this war effort. These troops know in combat that members—and a significant number of them—do not agree with this war effort. Yet they are pursuing it and risking their lives, and they are volunteering to stay in this force at overwhelming numbers. The highest re-enlistment rates we have are those in Iraq. That is staggering.

We have none of the major indicators that we had in Vietnam that an army is broken. Our absent without leave (AWOL) and desertion rates are very low. There are no chain-of-command and discipline problems. We do not have personal abuse problems like we had in Vietnam, and we are certainly not killing our officers to disrupt the chain of command.

That was an army that was disintegrating in front of us because it lost support of its people. This Army, because it has been a volunteer force and it is so professionalized and it is so disciplined and, in my view, it is extraordinarily idealistic, it is so far from broken. It is performing, in my judgment, in one of the highest moments we have ever had in our military capacity since the inception of the Nation.

And to use that phrase is a horrible description of who they are and what they stand for and what their commitment is. They are not broken, and it is not even close.

Mr. KORB. Mr. Chairman, could I respond to that? Because I think this is a really key issue here. This is not a war of necessity. It is a war of choice. The idea that somehow or another this is the central front on the war on terror is not true. In fact, going in here has made us less safe.

There is no doubt about the fact that these brave young men and women have done their job and they will because they are sent

over there, and I have no disrespect for them. But, with all due respect to General Keane, I am quoting General Powell, General McCaffrey, General Abizaid, General Odom. These are not people who do not know what is going on in this conflict.

And what you have is the same problem. Once you lower your recruitment standards, you are asking for trouble. The suicide rate is up. The desertion rate is up already. Are they at the same levels that we had in the 1970's? No. But this is the first war, extended war, that you have fought without conscription, and not only have you not raised taxes to pay for it, you have cut them.

So the idea that somehow or another, you know, we have this obligation because we were put in here under the wrong reasons, we were not told the truth about it—and then to blame the American people for turning against it? No, it is not the American people's fault. It is the fault of the Administration, and these brave young men and women are paying the price for that, and the country will pay the price for it in years to come because of the quality of people that are coming in.

Mr. HUNTER. But, Mr. Korb, I do not think those gentlemen, I do not think General Odom has said that the Army is broken, and that was the point that General Keane addressed.

And you have two points here. You go back and forth between not liking the war and saying that it is going to have an extraordinarily bad effect on our soldiers and that the soldiers are broken. You have not made that connection.

Have any of those people that you have quoted, did General McCaffrey say the Army is broken?

Mr. KORB. I will give you the exact quote, okay?

Mr. HUNTER. Okay.

Mr. KORB. "The ground combat capability of the U.S. Army forces is shot." And he said that with me when we testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, okay.

And if you would like, I would read General Odom's statement here about what is happening, the damage, to the forces. I would be happy to enter it into the record. I quoted some of it in my statement.

Mr. HUNTER. You said ground combat capability. That did not say the Army is broken.

Do you disagree with that, General Keane?

General KEANE. I certainly disagree with any characterization that the Army is broken. I mean, it is not and it is not even close in terms of their performance, their morale, their discipline, all the indicators that we judge the capacity of an Army to perform, and the best crucible to the judge and Army is in the field in combat, and it is magnificent, and their re-enlistment rates are off the charts for wanting to continue to do it. That is amazing.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hunter.

Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. Ortiz will be followed by Mr. Saxton.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

And I would like to welcome our witnesses today. Good to see both of you.

But, you know, we are involved in two vicious wars, and we are at war, but in order to win a war, we have to be successful, and in winning a war, we need to be able to train our troops and to be able to give them the equipment that they need.

As I visit the troops and we talk to industry, one of the problems that we have now is that industry has not been able to turn enough equipment to send to either Iraq or Afghanistan, and before, we were not even giving the troops the equipment to train before they went to Iraq.

And, yes, we have choices. Mr. Korb mentioned one of the choices that we have is a draft, and I do not believe in the draft. And the reason I say that is because we have some other hot spots around the world. I am concerned with Iran, I am concerned with North Korea and now a little concerned with Russia, and then I have a concern with what is going on in Central and South America, you know.

So what do we do to be able to motivate? Something has to be done to be able to give the soldiers the equipment that they need. They cannot produce enough mine resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs). They cannot produce enough High Mobility Multipurpose Military Vehicles (HMMVs). They cannot produce enough equipment. So how do we surge industry to be able to give, you know, the troops what they need?

I mean, we have 25,000 of them wounded, and we go to, you know, Walter Reed, and we go to Bethesda. In my opinion, we have serious problems, and maybe for future discussion and classified discussion, we need to talk about our prepositioning ships, and maybe that would be a subject for another hearing.

In my opinion, as chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, I feel that we have serious, serious problems with equipment and training of the troops, and maybe you can enlighten me as to what I am concerned with. Maybe I am wrong with what I have seen and what I have heard, and this is a question for both of you.

General KEANE. Well, Congressman Ortiz, I think your comment has a lot of merit. We do have choices, and we have made some difficult choices that have had some rather unhappy consequences. One of those choices deals with the industrial base.

The industrial base that supports the Army, the last time I checked, a number of months ago, was operating at a capacity under 60 percent, and yet we are at war. The industrial base that I am speaking of is the depot system inside the Army and the defense industry that assists the Army in dealing with resetting and re-equipping, and that is not operating anywhere near full capacity even now while we are at war.

Now why is that? Funding, money, a conscious choice not to take the industrial base capacity up to full capacity.

The CHAIRMAN. Noted disturbance. The gentleman will leave.

Please proceed, General.

General KEANE. Congressman, those are choices that we have made, and it also impacts on something the committee is very concerned about, as the chairman started out in his comments. It has an impact on the readiness of the force.

The reason why we had to move these brigades one a month is because equipment was the pacing item. We could not get the

equipment there fast enough because the industrial base is operating in the high 50 percent. Maybe it has changed a little bit in the last few months, but it could not have changed dramatically since the last time I checked.

If we did as you are suggesting, if we had a better strategy in terms of our equipment and we are willing to spend more money on it—and that is what the choice is here—then more of these units would be ready sooner, and I also believe they would, therefore, be able to train on some other things because they would have that equipment in time to be prepared for other contingencies as well as have enough time before they redeploy to Afghanistan and Iraq.

But these are choices we made, and we are living with those choices.

Mr. KORB. Congressman Ortiz, the problem is that the Pentagon, particularly civilian leadership, never went on a wartime footing when it came to procuring equipment. The reason for that is they did not think this war would go on this long.

Remember that they thought we would be down to 30,000 troops by the end of 2003. The President in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 kept telling us the progress we were making, so they never did what they should have done, and as a consequence, the young men and young women are suffering because of it.

I mean, Secretary Rumsfeld made a comment about you go to war with the Army you have. No, the fact of the matter is you started this war at a time of your own choosing, it was not necessary to do it when you did, you should have made sure that you were ready.

I am not a military expert like General Keane. I have some experience in the Pentagon and some experience in the Navy, but we were always taught when you go to war, you obviously hope for the best, but you plan for the worst. What they did was plan for the best.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

General Keane, in your opening statement, you made six points. The first is that we are on the offensive. The second is that security has improved across Baghdad. The third is that the grassroots movement among the Sunnis has taken hold, meaning the tribal leaders have taken over in Anbar and other places. The fourth is that al Qaeda is being defeated by our forces. The fifth is that the Shia militias can no longer get to the Sunnis because our troops are in the way fighting them back. And at the same time, our troops are protecting the Shia.

Those seem like six pretty good objectives being met by our Armed Forces. Would you think that we could do that if we had a broken Army?

General KEANE. Well, no, absolutely not. The quality of the leadership—and when I mean leadership, I am talking officers and non-commissioned officers—is extraordinary, and their commitment to the mission is.

We have so fundamentally changed what they were doing. Some of you who have been to Iraq, and some of you have been, but, you

know, for reasons I never quite understood, many of you were really denied the opportunity to get out and truly see how things are happening. But, nonetheless, the mission in the past was one of staying behind your forward operating bases, on occasion conducting presence patrols, focusing our classified forces on the al Qaeda and training the Iraqis.

We were never truly on the offensive except intermittently in Fallujah, Samara, a couple operations in Baghdad, and those were for a very short period of time. Now we are completely on the offensive. Our troops are out there protecting the people every single day, and they are much in for the mission.

One is they believe they are having an impact, and they see the results of what they are doing, and certainly, the second thing that is clearly happening is the impact that that is having not just on our own troops' morale, but even more importantly on the Iraqi people themselves. People were so concerned about it initially. When we go out into the neighborhoods and start living in them, the troops are going to be more vulnerable. On the surface, that is true.

But what actually happens, in fact, is the security becomes the people themselves because they start to provide information to us, and that is the other positive thing that is happening. All those Iraqis in the city and in the suburbs know that the security situation has improved, that 2007 is better than 2006, and certainly 2008 promises, you know, to be even better.

That kind of performance that they have turned in, to be able to change the strategy, change the tactics immediately and perform a mission to a very high standard is because they are exceptionally well-led, they are extraordinarily disciplined, and they are very, very dedicated.

Mr. SAXTON. General Keane, let me just ask you to look into your crystal ball for a minute. Having been where you have been in this process since and before the inception of operations in Iraq, if you had a crystal ball and could look in it, what do you see relative to the disposition of our troops going forward?

There are many members of this committee who would like to bring our troops home sooner rather than later. I guess all of us would. Do you see the surge continuing for an indefinite period of time, or do you see us getting into a position where we, in fact, will be able to begin to conduct operations in a different way or come home?

General KEANE. Yes, that is a great question, and I certainly do not want to prejudge what Ambassador Crocker or General Petraeus would say here in September. They are their own people, and they are going to speak their minds. And having spent many years with General Petraeus and just recently having acquired a relationship with Ambassador Crocker, I know they are going to be very forthright with you and very credible in doing it and comprehensive in letting you know what is happening.

But my view is this. This progress that we are making is steady, and it will continue to be steady, and it will cement the gains that we have made in terms of security and stability. I do believe that as time moves on, the significant change among the Sunnis is al-

ready beginning to impact the Shia government because the sheer scale of it, and it is something that they have to deal with.

I believe that more than any of these benchmarks, as we call them, will have more impact on the Shia government making a positive move toward reconciliation than some of the imposed artificial legislation, if you will, that we are imposing on them. That will be the most significant movement toward political reconciliation.

In terms of our troops, it was never intended to be permanent. It was always intended to be temporary. I believe the President was probably right in not talking a lot about it publicly, because he certainly did not want to flag all of that to our enemy even before we got started. But the fact of the matter is, in my own mind, I knew that we were going to pull forces back in 2008 regardless, regardless of whether we succeeded or regardless of whether it did not work.

Now I believe it is working, and what I would imagine would happen—and I do not want to prejudge what General Odierno and Petraeus are going to do, but in my own mind—and that is what you asked for—I think for sure—in 2008 we will see ourselves going back to pre-surge levels. In other words, coming down from 20-plus brigades to 15 brigades and, based on continued success and continued security, maybe even further in 2008, and then continue that movement in 2009, if that situation continues as we think it will, and that is with continued security and a stable process.

I know for a fact right now there are places in Iraq where we could transition with the Iraqi security forces based on their capacity to do it by themselves. So I think what you should do, in my view, is leave it up to Odierno and Petraeus to decide what the timing of this would be, sometime in 2008, where it is going to take place based on two things, enemy situation in a particular area and capacity of Iraqi security forces. Let them make that judgment.

This is in a public arena. I think I know how that would be done, but I would rather not say it here because it impacts on how the enemy would react to us. But, nonetheless, those forces would be reduced in 2008 based on the positive trends that we would have, and there is no reason to think that that could not continue, and let the tools stay in the hands of the commanders to do that deliberately, very methodically based on those two variables, the enemy and the capacity for the Iraqis to take over.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Abercrombie.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, the staff has passed out an amendment in the nature of a substitute to 3087. I would like to concentrate on that if I might because I am hoping that our guests would have an opportunity to take a look at that. I think that it may answer some of the observations that have been made and most particularly for Mr. Hunter because I want to tell you more about the motivation for this than the substance of it at this particular time.

The argument that goes back and forth is, "Well, you do not support the troops," or "You are not trying to end the war fast enough," that kind of thing. And so what we tried to do—and I say

we, this is a product of several people on both sides of the aisle—is to get beyond that so that the President is not in the situation of accusing the Congress of micromanaging. And we want most particularly to make sure that we do not end up making policy by default in the appropriations bill.

I am sure Mr. Hunter would agree with Mr. Skelton, both having been chairs, that it is crucial for the well-being of the Nation that we not end up making policy by default and in appropriations bills and that this is particularly the committee that should be doing that.

What we are saying is, “It is necessary and prudent for the Department of Defense to undertake robust and comprehensive contingency planning.”

By coincidence of events, Secretary Gates has sent a letter, because of circumstances taking place in the Senate, exactly the kind of argument that I am talking about where you get into accusations back and forth that undermine everything, where he says—and I am quoting from *The Post* today—that he is “personally engaged in developing contingency plans” and emphasized efforts that constitute “a priority for the Pentagon.”

And again, quoting Secretary Gates, “Such planning is, indeed, taking place with my active involvement as well as that of senior military and civilian officials and our commanders in the field,” as General Keane and others and Secretary Korb have pointed out as being essential.

My point here is that this bill 3087 was developed independent of all that because of the recognition that we have in Section 2 there that “contingency planning for redeployment of the Armed Forces should address”—and then I think it deals with virtually everything that Mr. Hunter has articulated and dealt with everything that both Mr. Korb and General Keane have articulated and for good reason, not because we are particularly perceptive, but we are trying to use the common sense and perception that we have as members of this committee and concerned individuals.

So what I am asking here, Mr. Chairman, and asking the witnesses if they can take a look at it. I realize you are here on short notice to begin with, let alone having to look at the substitute.

But our point here is stated completely, I think, and succinctly, in what we are asking the President to do, is that he present not later than 60 days—and what we are taking into account here is the recess that the Congress will be in and the presentation of the report by General Petraeus—then submit to the congressional defense committees the status of planning for the redeployment of the Armed Forces from Iraq, exactly the kind of contingency planning that sensible people in the Pentagon are doing anyway at the direction of the President, I am sure, and that we then have that before us so we can contemplate how to be helpful in bringing this to a conclusion.

So what I am asking you both to do is in the light of the substitute that is here, that is before us now, and in the light of the contingency planning protocols ensuring “appropriate protection of our Armed Forces, appropriate protection of contractors, Iraqi nationals,” et cetera, “maintaining and enhancing the ability of the

government to eliminate and disrupt al Qaeda,” et cetera, could you find that 3087 was useful?

General KEANE. In my judgment, the answer to that is no. And the reason is that, one, the Pentagon has already told you that they are conducting contingency planning dealing with a whole range of scenarios, and, two, I mean, certainly, you do not have the right legislation to ask them to share some of their thoughts with you.

The third thing is you are dictating missions, and that is what this is when you say “conduct the United States military operations, protect vital interests, conduct counterterrorism operations, protect the American forces,” et cetera, et cetera, and what you are also doing in that is leaving out missions. And I think that should be left to the province of the commanders in terms of what they are doing.

And just let me say here that there is a thought—and I think it is probably the most prevalent thought—among the options that people consider, is that all we need to do is pull back from the active and aggressive activity that we are currently conducting and train the Iraqi security forces, focus on the al Qaeda, therefore counterterrorism, and protect ourselves.

Well, that was the failed strategy that we have been doing for three years. That is the problem that is with that. That will get us a worsening situation. We would like to do that if we could be successful at it, but we are painfully aware that we failed at it, and there is no panacea there. It will get us a worse situation.

Second, we cannot dissect these activities by saying focus on the al Qaeda and kid ourselves that we would have forces who would only be able to focus on the al Qaeda. That is not possible. The al Qaeda is supported by a Sunni infrastructure and by Sunni insurgents, and the al Qaeda preys on Shias, and as a result of that, at times, they are going to respond.

So, by definition, you cannot just isolate the al Qaeda. We are kidding ourselves by suggesting that. It gives us comfort to say, of course, we will focus on the al Qaeda because the al Qaeda is a threat worldwide, and defeating the al Qaeda is in our Nation’s interest, as we are aware of, post 9/11.

But it is not that simple militarily in the application of force, is what I am suggesting to you, and that is why you cannot legislate these missions from here. These are tactical missions that you are providing here, and you have to leave this up to the commanders to make this kind of judgment, in my view.

Thank you.

Mr. KORB. I think it is rather interesting that we have now admitted that the strategy failed for three years. I never heard that, okay. I never heard that from people in the Pentagon, people in the field, a lot of the commentators who supported war. I never heard that, and all a sudden now, we are saying, “Well, this strategy failed. Therefore, we have to do the other one.”

Your amendment should be adopted for the following reason: This Administration never did a cost-benefit analysis of going into Iraq, and because of that, we are in the mess that we are in now. And I think it is important that you get them to do what they should be doing.

And, again, your amendment says, "Tell us what you are doing," and if General Keane is right with some of these reasons, then you will know about it.

But it is incredible to me that we could go to war without doing a cost-benefit analysis. So I think it is important to get them to do it now.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. Mr. Korb, where can I get the cost-benefit analysis of World War II? I would like to read that.

Mr. KORB. Well, I would be happy to talk to you about that because World War II was——

Mr. MCHUGH. Just all I need to know is where the cost-benefit analysis was done for World War II prior to our going to war. I would like to read it. You said you cannot believe we have not done it.

Mr. KORB. You do not do that for a war of necessity. You do do it for a war of choice.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Korb.

General, let us get down to the basics of this resolution, this piece of legislation before us. Simple question: Can we continue the fight in Iraq without waiver if this piece of legislation is passed?

General KEANE. No. In my judgment, not. You tie the hands of the commanders, and it results in reduction in forces.

Mr. MCHUGH. Mr. Korb, do you agree with that?

Mr. KORB. No, because you give the President a waiver.

Mr. MCHUGH. That is what I said. Can we fight it without waiver?

Mr. KORB. Well, no, that is the reason. The President then has——

Mr. MCHUGH. No is the answer. No is the answer. It is a simple answer. Yes or no.

Mr. KORB. Well——

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Korb.

General Keane, have you done any analysis or had the opportunity? And I know, as Mr. Abercrombie said, you have not had a lot of chance to look at this. How many brigade combat teams, how many units, whatever the measurement would have to be, would be taken off the board for deployability were this to be passed?

General KEANE. No, I would not be able to answer that, you know, at this session without doing some more analysis.

Mr. MCHUGH. Mr. Korb, could you answer that question, do you think?

Mr. KORB. What question?

Mr. MCHUGH. Well, did you do an analysis of this bill to understand how many forces would become unavailable were the bill to pass?

Mr. KORB. Well, I think that is what you want to have the plan, to find out how many you would need to do these things. That is why you want the planning to be done, and then you take a look at it and see if it makes sense. But it is important to know, in fact, what is going on and what people are thinking. We do not want to be caught short again like we were when we planned this inva-

sion and assumed we would be down to 30,000 troops by the end of 2003.

Mr. MCHUGH. You made the comment, Mr. Korb, that it was your opinion—and I can understand why you might have it—that we simply with a volunteer force cannot field the kind of long war army that is necessary. I think the phrase you said was we need to be honest with ourselves in contemplation of re-imposing the draft.

As I recall, the Reagan Administration had an all-volunteer Army. When you left that Administration, how many divisions were in the United States Army?

Mr. KORB. I think there were 16 divisions.

Mr. MCHUGH. And there were 18 at their peak under the all-volunteer Army. So we voluntarily have come down to 10. Do you think you could have fought a long-term war under the leadership of Ronald Reagan with 16 to 18 divisions?

Mr. KORB. No, we did not intend to, which is why President Reagan kept draft registration, because the idea was——

Mr. MCHUGH. Which we still have today, sir. So that is not really the issue.

Mr. KORB. That is why we kept it.

Mr. MCHUGH. Congratulations. Every Administration since has kept it as well. I do not think that is really the point.

Mr. KORB. No, it is——

The CHAIRMAN. Let the gentleman answer the question.

Mr. MCHUGH. Well, it is my time, Mr. Chairman, and the gentleman is very good at eating up other people's times. I would like to go to another question with General Keane. He has answered the question to my satisfaction.

General, do you think under the leadership of President Reagan we could have with 18 divisions fought a long war, even an Iraqi war?

General KEANE. Yes, absolutely. Essentially, the Cold War posture of the Army that had that kind of force structure—volunteers, I may add—would definitely be possible to make a commitment of around numbers of 150,000 and then, most importantly, be able to maintain a reserve of active-duty divisions that are not engaged in the war.

You could probably be able to sequester about four or five of them that would always be dealing with the possibility of another contingency someplace in the world, and you would rotate who they were so there would be obviously burden sharing with the war that you are currently fighting.

I mean, the stress and strain that we have is driven by the inadequate size of the active forces fundamentally and the disproportionate reliance we have on the Guard and Reserves.

Mr. MCHUGH. Mr. Korb, tell me. Who is the president for the Center of American Progress, that organization you are associated with here today?

Mr. KORB. His name is John Podesta.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, sir. I do appreciate it.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back.

Dr. Snyder, please.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. We appreciate your opinions and exchanges.

And, General Keane, we are looking forward to you being at our O and I (Oversight and Investigations) Subcommittee next week and to your contributions to your country continuing.

Mr. Hunter, I need a Vietnam infantry guy with legal experience that knows something about defense policy to answer my question, but I would like to just have a minute or two discussion with you about what you said during the opening statement.

You used the language that—I am talking about Mr. Skelton's bill now—it is putting units on the shelf, your word, and paralyzed the military. Tell me why you do not think that the language with the waiver takes care of it.

When we did this bill or did a bill several months ago, you were absolutely right about the way it was drafted. The way it was drafted, you know, they would have to sit for 30 days if their readiness levels were good. I mean, I thought it was poorly drafted, but I think the staff learned from you and Mr. Skelton and has responded to that.

Why does this cause any kind of limitation? The way I read it, the President can say, you know, I mean, these forces are going. Somebody sends a note. The President says, "Hey, they are in the planes. They are on their way." But the next three days, you just need to certify—and we are putting you on notice, Mr. President—these folks are going back sooner than our original plan was.

Why does this language paralyze the forces, or why do you think units are on the shelf the way that it is written?

Mr. HUNTER. Sure. Thanks for asking the question.

I think the Marines have said it best in this memo that they sent back to us. They said, "In order to support OIF requirements during fiscal year 2008 and comply with the minimum period between deployments proposed by the Skelton substitute, a 1:1 ratio, the Marines would have to adjust force generation plans. These plan adjustments could include extending unit deployments, creating provisional units and forcing units to execute missions as"—

Dr. SNYDER. If I want to reclaim my—

Mr. HUNTER [continuing]. "In lieu of forces"—

Dr. SNYDER. But—

Mr. HUNTER. But let me shorthand that, though, so I can finish my statement here.

Dr. SNYDER. Well, now let me reclaim my time because I understand all that. If there was no waiver, I would vote against it.

Mr. HUNTER. Yes. So here is the problem. You have—

Dr. SNYDER. All the Marine Corps has to do is go say to the President, "We sent these units or we had to send them within six months, not seven months. Sometime in the next 30 days, we need you to just waive these for us." But that takes care of that problem.

Mr. HUNTER. Yes, as I read this thing, it is waivers down to a unit that is commanded by a major. That is a small unit. So, in theory, we could micromanage every personnel policy in the military as long as we included a Presidential waiver. Now you know how long it takes for us to get a reprogramming on a vital piece of equipment that simply requires four signatures.

Dr. SNYDER. Reclaiming my time, we all had a very vigorous discussion this morning about——

Mr. HUNTER. But, first, Victor, there is a substantive reason here.

Dr. SNYDER. Reclaiming my time, please, we had a very vigorous discussion about the surge, whether it is working or not working. To me, I do not see that this legislation has anything to do with that.

The President could have, when he announced the surge, said, "I recognize this is going to be a burden on our troops. We are going to have to go back perhaps longer, and because of that, I want you to know that I am going to get a notification any time a unit is going to go longer than our original plan of having to stay home for this length of time, and my staff and I will personally, you know, sign off on that."

I do not see that this does anything more than give reassurances to military families and folks that they are being looked at, that they are being recognized that they are having to stay longer than what you originally cited, General Keane. I just do not see that the waiver interferes with it.

I am one of those Democrats, by the way, that voted against the bill a couple of weeks ago, because I thought that we had given assurances we would wait until mid-September, but I do not see that this does all the dire things of paralyzing units and putting units on a shelf.

To me, it is no different, Mr. Hunter, than every 30 days we sign off on our employees that this is the payroll. Well, there may not have been any changes for the preceding several months, but it is a reminder to us that, yes, we are certifying that that is where they are at.

Mr. HUNTER. Will the gentleman yield for just a second?

Dr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. HUNTER. Yes, I think taking this thing down to any unit that is commanded by a major, that amounts to us micromanaging. I mean, Vic, that means that you are going to have units that have specialties. One aspect of this war and any war is the unevenness of requirements of personnel. You are going to have the President doing nothing but signing off waivers for units right down to those commanded by a major?

Ms. TAUSCHER. If the gentleman will yield——

Mr. HUNTER. That is a small unit.

Ms. TAUSCHER. If the gentleman will yield, it is my bill, and I can perhaps answer this question. Will you yield?

Dr. SNYDER. I have no time.

The CHAIRMAN. Take the time. Take the time.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We will give you 30 seconds.

Ms. TAUSCHER. I think that the real issue here is the question of: Are we going to argue continuously about the surge, or are we going to argue about the legislation before us?

Now, if you are going to argue about the surge, you can find all kinds of reasons and excuses to be for it or against it, but the bill 3159 that Mr. Snyder was just talking about is a bill that effec-

tively does what the Congress is meant to do by our constitutional prerogative.

And part of it is to make sure that when we have forces in our military, that they are taken care of and that they have the well-time necessary to be sure that they can perform the duties for the American people, not only for the engagement that they may be in, but for future engagements and other contingencies that are surprising.

The bill does not require captains and lieutenants to ask for waivers. It can go all the way up to the brigade level. It can go even up to the division level. So that is the essence of what the bill does. So it is not requiring lower-level military to ask for waivers.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

Mr. Hunter wishes 30 seconds.

Mr. HUNTER. Yes. Just one point: The combatant commanders give us the requirement for the mix of forces that are needed and the rotation of forces that are needed. So if we get to the point where the President has to give a personal waiver every time you come to a unit that is major or above, I think you are getting way down in the weeds. And you are forcing the President to spend a ton of time overturning what are going to be recommendations that he is obviously going to accept from the field.

There is probably going to be no recommendation from the field on a force mix that the President does not agree with. So what we are doing is basically micromanaging and forcing him to undertake this analysis every time you have a unit that is commanded by a major or above.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNTER. It does not make sense.

Ms. TAUSCHER. If our military is too small to do the military mission, then that is the cost of doing business, with all due respect.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to have to cut this short and—

Mr. HUNTER. Let me just say to the gentlelady that is why we recommended that we go much higher and have done it for several years.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to have to cut this short.

Mr. Bartlett.

Ms. TAUSCHER. I know. I carried that bill, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

Thank you for your testimony.

Both of you are very familiar with our Constitution. Article I, Section 8 says that the Congress will make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. And Article II, Section 2 says the President shall be the Commander in Chief. What we are talking about in 3087? Is that an Article I, Section 8 issue, or is that an Article II, Section 2 issue?

General Keane and then Mr. Korb.

General KEANE. Well, in my judgment, the requirement for the level of forces and the amount of time that they are going to spend in a combat situation, is really the issue, and that is the province of the Commander in Chief and his commanders.

And when you nibble around the edges of that by playing with dwell time because of the perceived stress and strain on the force,

and that becomes your preoccupation, dwell time, then you are denying the commanders and the Commander in Chief, even though there is a waiver—I understand that—the full use of the forces for the time that they believe is necessary and the inherent flexibility that they need to prosecute the war.

You are putting the emphasis on back home here in the United States, in my view, as opposed to where it needs to be, is prosecuting the war. If you are going to do the war, then let us try to do it to the best of our ability. We have made——

Mr. BARTLETT. So you then——

General KEANE. We have made enough mistakes with this thing as it is.

Mr. BARTLETT. So you think it is an Article II, Section 2.

Mr. Korb.

Mr. KORB. No, I think it is Article I, and, in fact, if we take General Keane's position, you should not have prevented people during the war in Korea from going into battle with less than four months of training. So Congress has that power.

And I think it is important to keep in mind Article I comes before Article II when you are looking at the Constitution, and I can go back and give you a whole host of times where the Congress has had to step in when the policies of the Administration were actually not only strategically unsound, but morally unsound.

Mr. BARTLETT. If you would look at H.R. 3087, in the findings, it asserts there that the law that we passed on October 16, 2002, authorized “the President to use the Armed Forces as the President deemed necessary and appropriate in order to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by the government of Iraq” at that time. Do you think that that is a fair summary of the law that we passed?

Mr. KORB. I believe it is, and I think that those conditions no longer apply. You overthrew the government of Saddam Hussein, and the weapons of mass destruction are found not to be there.

Mr. BARTLETT. General Keane, do you agree that that was the sense of the law that we passed in 2002?

General KEANE. I think so, and, certainly, I agree with Larry the conditions have dramatically changed.

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, if that was the law that we passed in 2002 and if you agree with the second finding, and that is that Iraq no longer poses a threat, that government is gone, the leader is now tried and executed, would one then conclude that the President has no congressional authority? Because we are the ones who commit the troops to war, that we need to now determine whether or not the troops are going to be used in an additional capacity? They have done what we authorized the President to use them to do. Is that not true?

General KEANE. Well, the problem we had—and a number of us who were in uniform at the time, you know, bear some responsibility here—when we looked at conducting the invasion certainly, the military leaders—we did not anticipate that one of the options the regime had was not to surrender and——

Mr. BARTLETT. General, excuse me. My time is limited. I understand that.

General KEANE [continuing]. To continue to fight us. That is——

Mr. BARTLETT. The only point I am making is do you not think it is——

General KEANE. That is the basis for the struggle.

Mr. BARTLETT. Do you now think it is appropriate for the Congress to now take a new look at what we are doing there because what we authorized the Administration to do has been done, they did it very successfully? Isn't it appropriate that we take a new look at that? Don't you think this dialogue will benefit the American people?

General KEANE. Dialogue about something as serious as war always benefits the American people, to educate and to inform. I believe that law certainly covers the fact that the Sunni insurgency was the basis for the insurgency aided by the al Qaeda. It was the former regime elements that began it, and that is who we are fighting.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. General, earlier—I wish I could phrase it exactly—you said that Congress must fight its demons and not adopt this policy. We do not fight demons, General. We try to legislate. That is the purpose of our hearing. That is the purpose of excellent witnesses, such as you and Mr. Korb. I hope that that was said more in a moment of passion, rather than reflection, General.

General KEANE. It is rich language, Mr. Congressman. I understand that, I know that, but it was made not so much with this piece of legislation, but in a general comment to some of the things that have been happening up here, to be frank about it, and I fight my own demons, Mr. Congressman, and I do think we are fighting our demons and we are dealing with our fears here, and we are dealing with our frustration and also with our anger, and so I think the comment is appropriate.

The CHAIRMAN. We are dealing with legislation.

Ms. Tauscher.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am proud to offer H.R. 3159, which is the bill to mandate minimum periods of rest and recuperation for units and members of the regular and reserve components of our Armed Forces between deployments.

You know, I think that part of our responsibility here in Congress is not only to speak for the American people and be congruent with the Constitution, but to also understand, when there are very complicated issues, there are times when we have to use the legislative abilities that we have to clarify things for people.

There were many of us that, for many years since the 2002 invasion of Iraq, that wanted to increase the size of the active-duty forces and were completely thwarted by General Schoomaker. Certainly, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld basically laughed at us, told us we were out of our minds, we did not really need any more forces.

This is when they had that momentary burst of enthusiasm where they thought we were going to go down to 30,000 troops before they understood what President Bush the first understood, which was decapitating the government in Baghdad was going to cause all kinds of problems.

I think our bill is responsive to the American people, not only because of their significant turn-away from the Iraq war, but because they love our military. They deeply love our military. They understand their sacrifice, they understand what their families are going through, and their turn-away from the Iraq war is for many reasons.

Some of them were against the preemptive strike. Some of them were against war to begin with. Some of them over time increasingly are against it, and it is partly because we are using too much of their money and losing too many fine Americans over there for what they consider to be a civil war that cannot be won militarily, but also because they live in communities where our military live, and they see the strain on the families for no dwell time at home.

Now there is nothing about the bill that I propose that would cause the President 30 seconds of paperwork to continue military operations going forward. We can continue to distract each other absolutely out of our minds that this is about the surge, which I do not support, or even about the Iraq war. It is not.

The Congress has the duty, constitutional responsibility and the moral authority to speak for the American people. The American people are heartbroken that these military families see moms and dads coming home for five, six, seven months only to be turned around on a dime and sent back, knowing full well that they are not ready, they are not rested and they are not well-equipped. This is the point of this bill.

Now my colleagues can choose to find one more fig tree with one more fig leaf on it and decide that to pass, maybe a sense of Congress that wouldn't it be nice if we can do this, but this is the time, ladies and gentlemen, for us to take our spine-stiffening medication and stand up and do the right thing.

Now, General Keane, I honor your service, but, frankly, back in 2005, you were very optimistic, like you are right now, about training the Iraqi forces, "Although a civil war would be a tragedy with immense costs, it would be at least a force of definitive outcome to the ongoing struggle in Iraq, but there are no signs of this happening at the time."

With all due respect, sir, you were wrong then and you are wrong now. This is a bill we have to pass, and I hope my colleagues will indulge me. I do not have any questions. I think the answer is in the two bills that we are proposing today, and I hope my colleagues will support them.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

And, Dr. Korb and General Keane, I am going to read a couple of statements, and then I am going to have a question.

From the April 7, 2007, National Journal article for the Army Code Yellow, this is Barry McCaffrey, General McCaffrey, because I think all in this House and all in this committee probably have great respect for, as we do you, by the way.

"Despite all of those gimmicks, young battalion commanders tell me that recruiting standards have slipped terribly due to waivers. Drug and alcohol abuse have increased dramatically. The word has come down not to flunk anyone out of basic training, and we will

increase the age limit to allow 42-year-old grandmothers to enlist in the Army.” This is Barry McCaffrey now, not Walter Jones.

He further stated, “My bottom line is that the Army is unraveling, and if we do not expend significant national energy to reverse that trend, sometime in the next two years, we will break the Army just like we did during Vietnam. Only this time we will not have 10 years to fix it again. There will be no time-out from the global war on terror or threats like North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela, you name it.”

That is Barry McCaffrey. That is Barry McCaffrey.

From that article “Code Yellow,” the Pentagon Health Study released in January 2007, “the rate of binge drinking in the Army ballooned by 30 percent between 2002 and 2005, and the increase in illicit drug use nearly doubled between 1998 and 2005.” That sounds like to me there is a problem somewhere, okay.

Further—then I will close with a question—about March, April of this year, the President felt that he needed a war czar. I think we have a great Secretary of Defense, but, anyway, if he felt this, I respect what he felt he needed.

I do not know General John Jack Sheehan, but, like you—General Keane, I have a lot of respect for you—I have a lot of respect for him. But I do not know him—35 years Marine service. This was his quote in The Washington Post when he turned down the opportunity to be war czar. I am not going to read the whole quote, but just his last sentence: “The very fundamental issue is they do not know where the hell they are going.”

This is a Marine general, like you General Keane, a hero, you both. That is why Mrs. Tauscher, that is why Chairman Skelton, that is why this Congress, which has a constitutional responsibility to fund the military, also has a constitutional responsibility to debate the policy for the military. Whether that is good or bad, it does not matter. That is what we are required to do.

The fact is what General Sheehan said is why this Congress is trying to somehow be involved, as it should be involved.

And now I get to the question, and, Dr. Korb, I will start with you first after this rambling I have done. I am not going to read anything from this, but in May of this year, in the Raleigh, North Carolina, paper, the front page, “Deployed Depleted Desperate.”

I go to church with a family psychiatrist that works at Fort Bragg. He has asked me to please this August come visit with him and some families. Now I know this is one man, but he is doing something every day I am not doing, so I have to trust him. He wants me to hear the families because they are desperate, the families are depleted, and that is why it is important to have this debate, whether you vote for these bills or not.

We have not for five years, until this other party became the majority, had these debates. Would you answer me if you can, fairly quickly, because my time is going to expire? I guess they can finish the question. Would you respond to the things I read and maybe said?

Mr. KORB. Well, I know Jack Sheehan. I worked with him when he was the military assistant to Frank Carlucci, and I kept in touch with him when he was one of our combatant commanders. And I think he sums it up quite correctly, that, in fact, the Admin-

istration does not have an overall plan for what they are doing, and it is——

The CHAIRMAN. Finish your answer.

Mr. KORB. Okay. And I agree with the people there, with General McCaffrey that things are getting progressively worse. They were bad in 2006, their recruiting in 2007 is bad, and you have had the lowest retention rate among your West Point people—those are your future leaders—after their first tour, lower than it has been in 30 years.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Does General Keane have an answer to that?

General KEANE. No, I am not going to dispute General McCaffrey. He is welcome to his opinion. I just do not think it is anywhere near the degree of gravity that people are suggesting it is. There are some of those challenges, to be sure. It certainly is not affecting the performance of the force, is the way you have to judge it, and it is not affecting the overwhelming majority of the people who want to stay in it.

There are some recruiting challenges. I think the Army will probably miss their recruiting objective this year. They are trying to recruit a much larger force with the authorized increase that the President has given them. And I think there will be some challenges there but, overall, I think they will continue to make progress with that.

And, yes, the force is under stress and strain of being too small a force, fighting a war as long as we are fighting it. That is the reality of it. I do not dispute that. I think it is under stress and strain. But it is performing to a very high degree, and I do not see any indication that it will break in the next year or two—and that statement was made some time ago—and I think it will continue to perform at a very high degree.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much.

Ms. Davis please.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all, both of you, for being here.

It is really interesting because I think that our discussion today has gotten around to the role of the Congress. And I wonder if you could share with me, from the resolution initially proposed to go into Iraq until today, what your perceptions are of the Congress, and the way that role has been taken on?

And I know this is a big question, but if you can just be brief about that. You know, are there times when you have seen that that oversight has really not been present and does that in any way really inform the discussion that we are having today?

General KEANE. Well, I was here in uniform for most of that. And I have provided testimony before this committee many times, not on how the war was going, but, certainly, you know, how the Army was doing in support of it. And I believe this committee, as well as your counterparts in the Senate, have been very involved right from the beginning and have been concerned and tried to do things that should have been done, which I respected.

And that was make sure our readiness was right, make sure the size of the force was correct to meet the expanding obligations that the United States has in the 21st century. And I have agreed with

those efforts that you have made here, and I applaud you for them, and I have always respected your commitment to do these as well.

The law that was passed to support our efforts in Iraq, I certainly agree with. I thought it would have probably been better to wait a little while, while we were focused on the al Qaeda initially, but we are where we are and everybody has their opinion on it. But the fact of the matter is, that this body and the Senate has, I think, exercised appropriate oversight, and I think you should continue to do it.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Mr. Korb, did you want to respond?

Mr. KORB. I think the problem was that the government was controlled by one party, the Republican Party, and I think, because of that, the Congress was not able to provide some of the oversight that many members wanted.

I go back to when Senator Levin asked General Shinseki how many troops we would need to secure Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, and he gave the number of several hundred thousand. He was denounced for that by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and I think because the Congress was controlled by the same party, you did not, you know, follow up on that.

And I think it is very helpful for our democracy, now that Congress is beginning to play the role and ask the hard questions. And with the efforts of some of the bills here—Congressman Tanner, Congressman Abercrombie, Congresswoman Tauscher, Chairman Skelton—to begin to try and get this back under control as the Congress did—and people forget this—in 1951, insisted, because we were rushing people into war without adequate training, saying, “No, you have to have four months of training before you go into combat.” And I think that was important, and, in fact, my understanding is that law still exists today, that, you know, people must have that.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Can I ask you both, would it be appropriate for the Congress to be taking a much closer look at the relationship between military and civilian leadership at this time, and do you think that there were problems with it? Just a yes or no, because I have one or two other questions. Quickly.

General KEANE. I do not have any problem with that in time of war, when the stakes are so high, and we are losing lives, and the interest of the United States is so accented.

Mr. Chairman, I have to excuse myself. I agreed I had to leave at 11:30, and it is past that, and I—

The CHAIRMAN. General Keane, we understand that. As a matter of fact, we have four votes coming up at 11:30 a.m. ourselves. So we will excuse you.

Mr. Korb, if you could stay until 11:30 a.m.?

Thank you very much for coming and for your testifying today.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I look forward to future discussions, General, with the oversight.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Mr. Korb, did you want to respond to that in terms of—

Mr. KORB. Well, no, I certainly think this is the oversight role, to look at the relationship between civilians and military, and make sure that the military people can be completely forthright

with you without suffering any type of retribution if they disagree with the Administration policy. Because remember that the Congress has the power to raise armies and maintain navies and declare war, and the Congress back during the war in Vietnam insisted that the chiefs of service get a four-year tour. So they can be completely honest with you, and I think that is really what you need.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Korb.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cole.

Mr. COLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Well, I regret very much Mr. Keane had to leave.

First of all, I want to begin by honestly thanking both of you for your testimony. I think it has been some of the most passionate and some of the most interesting, and even though there is a great deal of disagreement, obviously, between the two positions represented, it has been enlightening. And it has been a good exchange and a helpful exchange.

I do want to take a moment of personal privilege just to disagree with you somewhat on your statement about a Republican Congress and Republican President, because if I followed that logic, I would say Korea did not work out well because we had a Democratic Congress and a Democratic President, or Vietnam did not work out well because we had a Democratic Congress and a Democratic President, or maybe World War II was not fought well because we had a Democratic Congress, a Democratic President.

I think the criticism is legitimate, if you want to say Congress did not do oversight. I think if you are going to draw that kind of partisan line, then you might as well draw it through all of American history. I do not think it is particularly helpful, but that is my view.

Let me ask you a question that I really wanted to put to both of you because you would have very different answers, and I really wanted to continue to hear this.

But I think the key issue here is not really the question of just what is happening militarily. I have a lot of confidence in our forces, and I do believe you both made the point about them being under strain, but I think they function well, I think they can do their mission, and I think they will.

But I will make the same point frankly to you that I have made in other contexts to the President, which is this really gets down to what the Iraqis can do at the end of the day. Our people will do their part of the mission, in my opinion. Whether Iraqi politicians are up to their part of the mission, I think is a very legitimate question.

And so I want to give you the opportunity, which I would have liked to give to Mr. Keane too, unfortunately, to respond to that.

Mr. KORB. Thank you very much.

I did not mean to imply it was just partisan, and that was my opinion, because it took a while in Vietnam, for example, for the Congress, even though it was controlled by both parties, to—

Mr. COLE. It was only controlled by one party.

Mr. KORB. Yes, that is what I mean. Well, controlled by one party. And I made that in my testimony.

The problem is the Iraqi government. And that is why I think the surge assumed that if you got the violence somewhat under control—and I do not agree. I mean, the number of attacks in June was 178 a day, so I do not think it is as under control as some people claim.

But it is the government. I was over there in April, sent over as part of a group from the National Academy of Public Administration to assess the capacity. I do not believe that they have the desire to do it because they are tough things to do. They are not willing to make these hard choices.

Mr. COLE. Can I follow up and get your opinion then on another issue related to that?

Accepting that viewpoint, what happens then afterwards? We all agree the numbers are going to come down. We all agree at some point the mission will end, Americans will come home. What do you see looking forward as far as you can in a very difficult situation?

Mr. KORB. Well, I think it depends on how you leave, when you leave, but until the Iraqis make these painful political compromises, no matter how long you say, there are going to be problems in the region. I do think if you set a date, if you work with the countries in the region, that gives you your best hope of making sure that whatever happens there does not undermine our national security.

Mr. COLE. Let us assume the worst. Let us assume that we do essentially leave, reduce our presence very dramatically, and they do not make the right decisions. What are the consequences for our country, not just for the region, but how would you see that?

Mr. KORB. Well, we have two vital interests there. One is to ensure that Iraq does not become a launching pad for international terrorism, and the other is that whatever happens there does not spread throughout the region. Those are our interests.

We have urged since 2005 to redeploy our forces out of Iraq, leave them in the region, which I think can prevent those things from happening, and the other is the countries in the region do not want to see that. I mean, even Iran does not want to see Iraq become a launching pad for a group like al Qaeda because that is a Sunni-dominated group, and they are Shias.

So I think that is our best hope to try and get this situation under control.

Mr. COLE. Couldn't al Qaeda continue to play off the division between Sunni and Shia? Couldn't the Sunni countries be drawn into the region out of fear of Iraq?

Mr. KORB. Well, I think they——

Mr. COLE. Excuse me. Iran.

Mr. KORB. Yes. I think they could be, and that is why you have to work with all of the countries in the region. I am also convinced that the Iraqi people do not support the foreign members of al Qaeda, and I think that once it is clear we are not there, the Iraqis themselves will deal with these foreigners.

Mr. COLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cole.

Mrs. Boyda.

Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was certainly hoping that General Keane would be able to be here as well.

Let me just say thank you for your testimony so much, Mr. Korb.

And I just will make some statements more for the record based on what I heard mainly from General Keane. There was only so much that you could take until we, in fact, had to leave the room for a while, and so I think I am back and maybe can articulate some things after so much of the frustration of having to listen to what we listened to.

But let me just first say that the description of Iraq as if at some point or another that it is a place that I might take the family for a vacation, things are going so well—those kinds of comments will, in fact, show up in the media and further divide this country, instead of saying, “Here is the reality of the problem, and, people, we have to come together and deal with the reality of this issue.”

Second of all, we have probably as much or more military in my district than anyone, and I hear over and over again that the Marines are at war, the Army is at war, and this country is at the mall, and the implication that it will take too much time for the President to come together and say that will take too much time for him to sign this waiver is almost more than I can sit here and bear.

This country has to come together, and to ask him to sign a waiver, I think, is very much not only the right of this Congress, but it is our moral responsibility to do so.

And, finally, I would just like to share a story. When I was speaking back at home with one of a very right-wing conservative talk-show hosts and, thank God, after we were off the air—I said something that I assumed he would agree with, and I just said, you know, “I am really worried about these guys and gals—mainly guys—that have gone and they have been redeployed now three and four times.”

He came back to me and said, “You know what? They should have thought about that before they enlisted, before they signed up.” He said, “It is their fault.”

And I was so upset. I looked at him, and I said, “With all due restraint”—and I said no respect, not with all due respect, because, quite honestly, I have no respect for that kind of an opinion—with all due restraint—and I got myself calmed down and left the room.

But I am very disappointed. I would hope that General Keane would not say that, but I am very disappointed that, where is he to get up and defend and take care of the men and women who have so honorably served our country? Where is he? And where is the rest of this military to say this is the right thing to do?

Now, with all due respect, this country has to come together and first and foremost deal in the reality of the situation and find a way to come together and put these crazy partisan politics behind us and come up with a way forward, and maybe that is where I should stop.

And I will yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

Mr. Wilson from South Carolina.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And, indeed, we are expecting votes any time now, so I will just make a statement myself. And, in fact, my statement is how much I appreciate the heartfelt praise that General Keane has given for our troops. I share his view. I share the view that we have the new greatest generation who has dedicated themselves to protecting American families by understanding that we must stop the terrorists overseas so they do not return to the United States.

Additionally, I have the perspective that I have visited Iraq seven times. I have visited Afghanistan three times. I particularly am very proud of the National Guard. I served 31 years in the National Guard. I was able to visit in Afghanistan 2 months ago with the 218th Mechanized Infantry Brigade that I served with for over 20 years. I know hundreds of the people in that unit. They are so proud to be serving. They are so proud and understand the importance of what they are doing.

There is not this feeling that I have heard of negativism at all, and their families are so proud of their service, and, again, I understand the extraordinary circumstance of the young people serving our country because I have four sons who are serving in the military. One served for a year in Iraq. Another has served in Egypt. Another will be deployed soon. And so I am very, very grateful for the young people serving our country.

Additionally, this month, I visited and participated in the graduation of the recruits at Parris Island that I represent. I earlier had been at a graduation at Fort Jackson that I represent for new recruits. The young people coming in are extraordinary. I mean, it just makes you feel so good.

And I really wish the American people could see the quality of the young people who are enlisting, the quality of the young people who are serving. It just would make your heart burst, as General Keane indicated, and so, again, I hope more people have the opportunities that I have had and get to know the people, as I have, particularly the persons serving in our military.

And, again, I am just grateful for their service. They are protecting America, and their success, I believe, has been shown because we have not had a major attack in the United States since 9/11, and we need to keep that in mind, that that was an attack on us. It was preemptive by the enemy, not by us.

I yield the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Loebsack please.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

First of all, I do want to thank you, Mr. Chair, for bringing up the issue of demons. I have only been in this Congress since January 4, and I wish General Keane were still here, because I would ask him specifically what demons he is referring to. Not much has sort of gotten to me since I have been here, but that statement did, as a matter of fact, get to me as a new Member of this Congress.

I am not here to deal with demons or fears or whatever the case may be. I think I am here to, as the chairman said, legislate and do the best I can for the people in my district, and for the people of America.

So thanks again, Chairman Skelton, for bringing that issue up at the time.

I want to ask you, Mr. Korb, to respond to the general's comment. I think he said—I could be wrong—that this war is in America's national interest. Can you respond to that?

Mr. KORB. This war was a war of choice that basically got us away from dealing with the real threat to the country. There were no weapons of mass destruction, no ties to al Qaeda, no connection to 9/11. And what it has done, as the recent National Intelligence Estimate pointed out, it has allowed al Qaeda to reconstitute itself on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Going in there was the best recruiting tool that al Qaeda has had.

You have also had—and it has not even been discussed that much—evidence of blowback. A lot of the people, foreigners, who have gone into Iraq are going to go home with this training and cause problems in other parts of the world.

And with all due respect to the people fighting, I have the greatest admiration for them, but if you look at the long-term trends of the people that you are bringing in, you are not going to have an Army that is as good as the Army that you sent in. If you take in 900 felons, if you cut down the number of people in basic training flunking-out by half, you are not going to get as good people.

And when you see your West Point people leaving in levels that they have not done in 30 years, that is your future leadership. And people have talked a lot about retention here. Yes, retention is up for career people, but not for people completing their first tours. Those are the people that you need to keep in, and in a couple of years, we are going to have to deal with that situation.

We do not have, even according to General Pace, the troops we need if something should happen in another place—Iran, North Korea, Pakistan—where we need to go. So we basically by doing this unnecessary war have weakened our security.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Let us say that the United States is out of Iraq in the next 10 to 12 months, as I think you suggest in your testimony—and I know early on you talked about it being 18 months, but we have seen a number of months go by now, and I assume that is how you are getting to 10 to 12 at this point—but you mentioned that it is not necessarily in the interest of the neighbors of Iraq to intervene once we are out.

Can you elaborate on that a little bit, and speak to the Syrians, if you will, too, and what might happen in Kurdistan as well?

Mr. KORB. None of the nations in the region have an interest in Iraq becoming a failed state or a launching pad for international terrorists. And as we saw with the Iranians in Afghanistan, countries will do what is in their best interest. The Iranians helped us initially in Afghanistan because they felt threatened by al Qaeda and the Taliban.

So you have to work with the countries in the region because each of them has got to realize that if it becomes a failed state, they are all threatened. They are all involved. Iran is involved. Syria is involved. Saudi Arabia is involved. And, basically, what you have to have them is involved constructively so that Iraq does not become a threat to its neighbors.

We have urged at the center, back when the President came out with this military surge, a diplomatic surge could get the countries in the region involved, and I am convinced, until we set a date to

leave, they are not going to do it because it is not in their interests to do so.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Korb.

For the record, I do want to thank you and General Keane for your service. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Turner, please.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing. And this is so important to have this discussion in this manner because some of the statements that are made can be evaluated for the weight in which we need them for policy decisions.

Mr. Korb, I was looking at your bio. We had a summary that was given to us by staff that incorrectly, I believe, referred to you as Dr. Korb, and you do not have a Ph.D.

Mr. KORB. I do.

Mr. TURNER. You do have a Ph.D.? It is not in your bio, and we have materials that are conflicting, Mr. and Dr. What is your Ph.D. in?

Mr. KORB. Political science.

Mr. TURNER. Political science. And that would go along with then when you told us that you are not a military expert because that was your words.

Mr. KORB. I said I am not the expert that General Keane is, but my concentration has been on military affairs. That is what I have worked on. I have taught at the Navy War College, the Coast Guard Academy, and, obviously, I had some time in the Pentagon in the Reagan Administration.

Mr. TURNER. Yes. Yes, I see that in your bio. I did write down your words when you said you were not a military expert.

What fascinated me, which I think is what is so important about your testimony, is that it says in your bio that you have made over 1,000 appearances as a commentator on shows such as "The Today Show," "The Early Show," "Good Morning America," "Face the Nation," "This Week with David Brinkley," "The MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour," "The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer," "Nightline," "60 Minutes," some pretty substantial appearances on talk news on discussing the important policy issues that we have here.

In looking at your testimony, you have given your testimony, you have made some statements that I think are consistent with a television commentator, but I looked at the citations because you have given us this testimony as if it is in an academic form, and I have not seen the citations like this before before the committee. That is why they caught my eye.

Your first three footnotes of your testimony are to your own article. You cite yourself as the source of information for the first three footnote citations. I have not seen that very often where someone cites themselves.

Then the next one that you cite, the first footnote that is not citing yourself, you cite the Web site of House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer as part of your credential for your testimony before the House Committee, a Web site of the Majority Leader Steny Hoyer.

Then the remainder of your citations are all news articles. You cite the New York Times, The Washington Post, the Plain Dealer, the New York Times, USA Today, the Inter Press Service, Niemen Watchdog.

You get down to the end where you cite the Congressional Research Service for the first time that you cite something that is not just a news item, and that citation relates to the Philippines in 1915, the Korean War in 1951, and the U.S. forces deployed to NATO in 1985, and then your citations end.

So your citations are all—about this conflict and about this information that is before us—news sources. And I can tell you and the people on this committee I have a great deal of respect for, and I know we are all well-read. We have all read The Washington Post, The New York Times, USA Today.

Usually, when we have a hearing where we have someone come before us to testify, we are looking for them to bring us information that is not just what we could have read in Time or New York. They do not just state their opinion as a TV news commentator, but they actually give us statistics and information which is relevant to the decision-making process, and I believe General Keane did that.

I yield back.

Mr. KORB. Do I get to respond?

Mr. TURNER. I yield back.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KORB. General Keane had no footnotes and his were all opinion.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chair, may I make a—

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. Just a minute.

Mr. Korb, do you want to respond?

Mr. Turner, please listen to his response.

Do you have a response to that?

Mr. KORB. Normally, people do not. If you go and you look at the things I cited, the studies we have done at the center, they are footnotes, and you can take a look at it here. We tell you the sources. Then when I quote The Post, for example, it was an Army mental health study that was reported in The Post. That is what I am getting those, you know, figures from.

The Niemen cite basically is General Odom, Lieutenant General William Odom's cite, about comparing what has happened. This is not a refereed article. Most people do not—General Keane had not a single source. His were all opinions, okay.

If I were preparing this for an academic referee journal, I would obviously, you know, do better, but I had no time to do this. I was just called very quickly. And what I was trying to tell you is if you want more information, you can go to these things.

And the Congressional Research Service was asked by the Congress to take a look in support of these amendments, which is why I went to those things.

But I will put my record in terms of scholarship, in terms of analysis of war, in terms of military issues up against anybody.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Korb.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Korb—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, a point of information.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Just so the record is clear on this, my first contact with Mr. Korb, which he will not remember after his long and distinguished career, was when he was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for manpower, reserve affairs, installation and logistics, and I was a member of the Hawaii state legislature in charge of education and impact aid.

Mr. Korb was kind enough to take time out to spend time with a little state legislator who had all these serious concerns. And if he was good enough for Ronald Reagan, apparently, he was good enough to talk with Representative Abercrombie and inform him.

And I never forgot that exchange, I can tell you, and that must be more than a quarter of a century ago. He does not remember me, but I remember him.

The CHAIRMAN. Everybody remembers you, Mr. Abercrombie.

Mr. KORB. I remember you.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Mr. Chair, may I have 30 seconds?

The CHAIRMAN. First, let me say that I worked, well, a good number of years ago when you were on Ronald Reagan's staff and you were an assistant secretary. We thank you for your service then as well as now. This is very, very important.

Mr. Loeb sack, do you have a comment?

Mr. LOEBSACK. Yes, just for a few seconds. As someone who has a Ph.D. in political science myself, and having taught for 24 years at a small college, I am happy to say I believe that Mr. Korb is eminently qualified to speak on these issues, much more so than I am, certainly.

And I have had the pleasure of having him in class two times at Cornell College in Iowa, and I can attest to his credentials. And I think that he is one of the very few people here in Washington, D.C., who has managed to combine academic credentials and government service to the extent to which he has. And I vouch for his academics as well as his professional career.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very, very, very much.

Now, Mr. Sestak, before calling you, we did announce earlier that there is a drop dead moment on this hearing, which would be high noon. So you take your five minutes. Then, unfortunately, we will have to close this hearing.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Please proceed.

Mr. SESTAK. I think I will have three comments, if I might.

On the first, the general has left, but it would be remiss of me not to talk about the comment about demons. I think the general, if he was here, would recognize that General Shelton, who he and I both respected so much, when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the beginning of Mr. Rumsfeld's era, used to hand out a book called "Dereliction of Duty."

He just asked all of us to remember that the failure at times during Vietnam for men and women to speak up might have helped lead to the wrong course. And so I think in the emotions of all this, there are demons, but I like to think about it as the debate of frank ideas.

Second, I want to speak about these two pieces of legislation that Ms. Tauscher brought and said we really are here today. In the

very first one, I think a good comment was made by the general. The study that was done at the end of Vietnam had shown that if we had not rotated our troops out of Vietnam, we actually would have had better warfighting capability. Men and women learn, and then they are more proficient.

Like we did in World War II, we kept our men and women out there. But the difference between World War II and this war is that, on average, a man, a woman in combat in World War II did 180 days combat. Our men and women in Iraq, in their 15 months, every day, they do combat. Every day, they go outside the wire, and they do not know when that car is there.

And so there is a constitutional duty that says for Congress to provide for the rules and regulation of our armed services. We would be remiss not to see if the rule of turnaround time was proficient.

To my colleague from California, it is a requirement, I understand, that might take a little bit of more effort, but our national command authority, is by law the President and the Secretary of Defense are required before any unit deploys overseas to approve it. It is just merely a paper over here to say they need it. Now, normally, the Secretary of Defense approves it, but they have national command authority, and both of them have to approve it. So I think that is good.

The second one is I am very interested in this one by Mr. Abercrombie that is being submitted because we can learn from it. We have to keep in mind that before we set any date certain, we have a lot to learn over here. Somalia took us 5 months to get 6,300 troops out, and we inserted 19,000 personnel to protect them. The Russians took 9 months to get out of Afghanistan with less troops, and 500 died on the way.

Right now today, we have 40 brigade combat teams in Iraq equivalent. You can only put two through Kuwait because you know you have to wash them, customs, put shrink wrap on them, put them in a boat. They can do two brigades, maybe two and a half a month, unless we build more facilities there. That is 15 to 20 months alone, if you go by how we do it.

And if you look at the plan the Army had in 2006 to close the forward operating bases (FOB) in Iraq, because they did look at this, there are 58 of them. They want to do four at a time in that plan. You know what that means? It is 100 days to close 4 at a time. You work that out, you are almost to four years, if you want to close up the FOB and clean up after it.

So this is an important piece of legislation. And I am a person who believes in a date certain for the reasons, Mr. Korb you say, but we have to make sure that ending this war is necessary, but insufficient, how, and the means by which we do it have a lot to do with the safety of our troops, as they have to come down Route Tampa, one road to Kuwait.

It already has 2,000 trucks a day on it. Imagine everyone coming together, packing their stuff. You have to have security convoys. You have to get in Kuwait. You have to time the ships. Our due job is to make sure as we provide for the common defense to make sure that there is some thinking on it so that we do not inherently put more of a mess out there by the wrong date certain.

So I am taken by these comments, and I will wrap up of why these two pieces of legislation are important for us and our constitutional duty and to make sure as we do do things, we have the data not to make a mistake.

Comment?

Mr. KORB. Well, I think you are quite right. We want to make sure that we get out much more carefully than we went in.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

And, Dr. Korb, we thank you.

And we have already said goodbye and thanked General Keane a few moments ago.

We will reconvene at 1 p.m., and I hope we have full attendance to mark up two bills.

And I thank you for the testimony and the participation today.
[Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

JULY 27, 2007

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 27, 2007

**Testimony of
Lawrence J. Korb**

**Before the
House Armed Services Committee
July 27, 2007**

Senior Fellow and Director of Military Strategy,
The Center for American Progress,
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Testimony of Lawrence J. Korb
House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2007

Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member Hunter, and members of the House Armed Services Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you with these genuine war heroes to discuss the situation in Iraq and the current state of the nation's ground forces. I cannot think of more critical issues facing the nation at this time.

After more than four years of being engaged in combat operations in Iraq and six and a half in Afghanistan, America's ground forces are stretched to their breaking point. Not since the aftermath of the Vietnam War has the U.S. Army been so depleted. In Iraq, more than 3,600 troops have been killed and more than 25,000 wounded. The Army is severely overstretched and its overall readiness has significantly declined. As General Colin Powell noted last December well before the surge, the active Army is about broken, and as General Barry McCaffrey pointed out when we testified together before the Senate Armed Services Committee in April, "the ground combat capability of the U.S. armed forces is shot." The Marine Corps is suffering from the same strains as the Army, and the situation for the Army National Guard is even worse.

Meanwhile, the combat readiness of the total Army (active units, the National Guard, and the Army Reserve) is in tatters. In the beginning of this year, General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, conducted his own review of our military posture and concluded that there has been an overall decline in military readiness and that there is a significant risk that the U.S. military would not be able to respond effectively if it were confronted with another crisis. The simple fact is that the United States currently does not have enough troops who are ready and available for potential contingency missions in places like Iran, North Korea, Pakistan or anywhere else. For example, when this surge is completed all four brigades of the 82nd Airborne will be deployed, leaving us with no strategic ground reserve. Even at the height of the Korean War, we always have kept one brigade in the continental United States. But it is not simply that so many of our soldiers are committed to Iraq, but that so much of the Army's and the Marine Corps' equipment is committed to Iraq as well.

Testimony of Lawrence J. Korb
House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2007

The decision to escalate or to “surge” five more brigades and a total of 30,000 more ground troops into Iraq has put additional strain on the ground forces and threatens to leave the United States with a broken force that is unprepared to deal with other threats around the world.

But the situation facing the ground forces is more than just a strategic crisis – it is a moral one as well. More and more of the burden of the war in Iraq is falling on the men and women in uniform who volunteered to serve this country, and we are putting them in harms way without all the preparation and dwell time they deserve.

To meet the manpower requirements called for in the President’s latest escalation, Army and Marine Corps commanders are being forced to cut corners on training and equipment, thus putting additional stress on those in uniform. The unprecedented decision by the Bush administration to extend the tours of Army brigades currently deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan from 12 months to 15 months, something that was not even done in Vietnam when we had over 500,000 troops on the ground or in Korea where we had over 300,000, is the latest illustration of the unreasonable stress being placed on our ground forces.

Before commenting on the recommendations that this committee is considering to relieve the burden on those serving, let me discuss the misuse of the all-volunteer military in Iraq, the rapid pace of deployments, the inadequate amount of dwell time between deployments that is currently being provided to the ground forces, and the impact this is having on the ground forces and their families.

I. Ground Forces Overstretched – Passing the Burden to the Troops

Iraq and the Misuse of the All-Volunteer Military.

The current use of the ground forces in Iraq represents a complete misuse of the all-volunteer military. America’s all-volunteer Army, made up of well-equipped and highly trained active-duty soldiers, backed up by a ready reserve, was designed to act as an

Testimony of Lawrence J. Korb
House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2007

initial response force, a force that would be able to repel and counter aggression. If America ever found itself in a long protracted ground war, or was forced to act against an existential threat, the all-volunteer force was to act as a bridge to re-instating conscription. This is why we require young men to register when they turn 18.

The all-volunteer force, particularly the Army component, as General John Abizaid, former head of the Central Command, noted last fall, was not “built to sustain a long war.” Therefore, if the United States is going to have a significant component of its ground forces in Iraq over the next 5, 10, 15, or 30 years, then the only correct course is for the president and those supporting this open-ended and escalated presence in Iraq to call for re-instating the draft. That would be the responsible path.¹

In my view, however, this would be a mistake on par with the initial invasion of Iraq. Instead, I believe the United States should set a firm timetable for the gradual redeployment of U.S. forces over the next 10 to 12 months. During that time the United States should work to train and support Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi government while gradually handing over responsibility for security to the Iraqis. This action should be backed up with a diplomatic surge in which the United States would engage all countries in the region. There is no guarantee that this approach will be effective in stabilizing Iraq or the region. In fact, given the misleading justifications for the initial invasion and the way in which the Bush administration has conducted the war, there are no good options left. But I believe that this course, a strategic redeployment and a diplomatic surge, as well as a strategic reset of our entire Middle East policy, provides the best chance for stabilizing the region as well as mitigating the impact of Iraq on the ground forces and U.S. national security. As General Maxwell Taylor noted some three decades ago, “we sent the Army to Vietnam to save Vietnam; we withdrew the Army to save the Army.” The same is even more true in Iraq today.

¹ Lawrence Korb and Max Bergmann, “Bush’s Draft Dodge,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 26, 2007.

Testimony of Lawrence J. Korb
House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2007

Rapid Pace of Deployments.

Following September 11, the Bush administration had a tremendous opportunity to increase the size of the ground forces. Unfortunately, the president and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld pursued a misguided policy. Instead of increasing the size of the ground forces they actually sought to cut them. This error was compounded when the Bush administration diverted its efforts from Afghanistan and proceeded to undertake an ill-advised and unnecessary invasion of Iraq. This strategic mistake has allowed the Taliban and Al Qaeda to reconstitute in Afghanistan and Pakistan, weakened the standing of the United States in the world, and has undermined the nation's efforts in the fight against the radical extremists responsible for the attacks on 9/11.

Today there is little doubt that the ground forces are overstretched. Currently, the Army is being deployed at a rate not seen since the advent of the all-volunteer Army. In early March, the Center for American Progress released a study chronicling the effects that sustained deployments in Iraq are having on the Army.² By analyzing every Army brigade, we were able to convey the strain and fatigue placed on the force and illustrate its implications for our nation's national security. The facts that we compiled are troubling:

Of the Army's 44 combat brigades, all but the First Brigade of the Second Infantry Division, which is permanently based in South Korea, have served at least one tour. Of the remaining 43:

- 12 Brigades have had one tour in Iraq or Afghanistan
- 20 Brigades have had two tours in Iraq or Afghanistan
- 9 Brigades have had three tours in Iraq or Afghanistan
- 2 Brigades have had four tours in Iraq or Afghanistan

² Lawrence Korb, Peter Rundlet, Max Bergmann, Sean Duggan, and Peter Juul, "Beyond the Call of Duty: A Comprehensive Review of the Overuse of the Army in Iraq," Center for American Progress, March 2006.

Testimony of Lawrence J. Korb
House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2007

Reserve Component.

The reserve component is also in tatters. Lt. General Steven Blum, the head of the National Guard Bureau, stated that the National Guard is “in an even more dire situation than the active Army but both have the same symptoms; I just have a higher fever.” The Pentagon has had to increasingly employ the National Guard and Reserve in order to meet demands on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.

To make matters worse, the Pentagon has notified four National Guard brigades to prepare again for duty in Iraq. Some 12,000 troops are scheduled to be deployed to Iraq early next year. This would be the first time that a full Guard combat brigade would be sent to Iraq for a second tour. These deployments are becoming increasingly necessary because the regular Army is not large enough to handle the mission in Iraq on its own. Originally these Guard units were to serve no more than 24 months total. However, these units and others in the Guard have already served 18 months—with training time and time in Iraq or Afghanistan—and now they are looking at least another 12 months in Iraq.

With the Pentagon straining to keep force levels high in Iraq, the Guard and Reserve are being used as an operational reserve, rather than a strategic reserve as was intended when we created the all-volunteer force, alternating deployments with the active force. The nation’s current reliance on the Guard to fight two major ground wars is unprecedented.

Since 2001:

- Every Enhanced Brigade has been deployed overseas at least once and two have already been deployed twice.³
- Eleven have deployed to Iraq, three to Afghanistan, and two to the Balkans. Currently two of the Enhanced Brigades are in Iraq and one has just returned from

³ Lawrence Korb, Sean Duggan, “Caught off Guard,” *Center for American Progress*, May 2007.

Testimony of Lawrence J. Korb
House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2007

Afghanistan—a brigade combat team from the Minnesota Guard has been in Iraq since March 2006 and has been extended through this month.⁴

- All told, more than 417,000 National Guard and Reservists, or about 80 percent of the members of the Guard and Reserve, have been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, with an average of 18 months per mobilization. Of these, more than 84,200, or 20 percent, have been deployed more than once.⁵

Guard Units that are scheduled to be deployed later this year include the 39th Infantry Brigade, the 45th Infantry Brigade, the 76th Infantry Brigade, and the 37th Infantry Brigade Combat Team. None of these units has received proper dwell time according to the Pentagon's previous policy limiting involuntary mobilization of Guard members to no more than 24 months every five years. Under the Bush administration's revised rules announced last January, these units can be called up involuntarily and without proper rest and training. A closer look at these 4 brigades reveals significant shortcomings:

- The 39th Infantry Brigade from Arkansas, returned from Iraq in March 2005 after a one-year tour in country and 18 months on active duty. It is scheduled to go back to Iraq in December of this year, about two and a half years after returning. Of particular concern to Capt. Christopher Heathscott, a spokesman for the Arkansas National Guard, is that the reality of going to Iraq next year could cause some Arkansas reservists not to re-enlist this year. "Over the next year roughly one-third of the soldiers in the 39th will have their enlistment contracts expire or be eligible for retirement," Captain Heathscott said. Moreover, the brigade is short 600 rifles.⁶
- The 45th Infantry Brigade from Oklahoma, which returned from a 12-month deployment to Afghanistan in December of 2004, it is now slated to go back to

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Website of House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, <http://majorityleader.house.gov/docUploads/Iraqbythenumbers031907.pdf>.

⁶ David S. Cloud, "Units of National Guard May Return to Iraq Early," *New York Times*, February 22, 2007.

Testimony of Lawrence J. Korb
House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2007

Iraq in January of 2008, about three years after returning from Afghanistan—even though one-third of the unit lacks standard issue M-4 rifles.⁷

- The 76th Infantry Brigade from Indiana, returned from a year-long deployment to Afghanistan in August 2005. It is now scheduled to go to Iraq in January 2008, some 29 months after coming back from Afghanistan. Major General R. Martin Umbarger, head of the Indiana National Guard, has recently commented that “what keeps me up at night is, I think I am able to surge...for the normal disaster, but if I needed to deploy every bit of my soldiers and airmen, I know for a fact I do not have enough equipment.”⁸
- The 37th Infantry Brigade Combat Team from Ohio, which returned from a six-month deployment to Kosovo in February 2005, it is now scheduled to go to Iraq for a year-long deployment in January 2008, less than three years after returning from its Kosovo deployment. Mark Wayda, director of the government and public affairs office for the Ohio National Guard, recently noted that “there’s a whole host of things the National Guard just doesn’t have or doesn’t have of sufficient quantity to do their missions.”⁹

Sustained Combat and Inadequate Rest.

The task of sustaining or increasing troop levels in Iraq has forced the Army to frequently violate its own deployment policy. Army policy mandates that, after 12 months of deployment in a combat zone, troops should receive 24 months at home for recuperation and retraining before returning to combat. According to the Army, after a unit is deployed for one year it should receive one year of recuperation followed by an additional year of training before being redeployed to theater. Even before the surge, the Army had reduced the dwell time, or time between deployments, to one year.

⁷ Oklahoman, February 1, 2007.

⁸ Tyson, Ann Scott “Most National Guard Units Rated Not Ready for Service,” *Washington Post*, March 2, 2007.

⁹ *Plain Dealer*, February 18, 2007.

Testimony of Lawrence J. Korb
House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2007

To comply with the president's current escalation plan, the Army has been forced to "short cycle" units, or deploy units back into battle with less than two years time for recuperation, rest and training—and in some cases, with less than even nine months. Moreover, at least 10 Army brigades have had their tours in Iraq and Afghanistan extended while abroad. A unit of the second brigade of the first armored division is scheduled to go back to Iraq nine months after returning.

It is also wrong, both militarily and morally, to send troops into a war zone who are not fully combat ready. Three units that are part of this surge show what happens when units do not receive what the Army calls the proper dwell time between deployments.

- The 1st Brigade of the Army's 3rd Infantry Division based at Fort Stewart became the Army's first brigade to be deployed to Iraq for the third time. It was sent over in January 2007 after about a year at home. But, because of its compressed time between deployments, some 150 soldiers joined the unit right out of basic training, too late to participate in the unit training necessary to prepare soldiers to function effectively in Iraq. Unfortunately one of the 18-year-old soldiers, Matthew Zeimer, who joined the unit on Dec. 18, 2006, was killed by friendly fire on Feb. 2nd after being at his first combat post for just two hours. He missed the brigade's intensive four-week pre-Iraq training at the national training center at Fort Irwin, California, getting instead a cut rate 10-day course.
- The 4th Brigade of the Army's 1st Infantry Division based at Fort Reilly was sent to Iraq in February, about a year after it was reactivated. More than half of the brigade's soldiers classified as E-4 or below and are right out of basic training and the bulk of its mid-level non-commissioned officers in the ranks of E-5 and E-6 has no combat experience.
- The 3rd Division's 3rd Brigade was sent back to Iraq this month for the third time after spending less than 11 months at home. In order to meet personnel requirements, the brigade had to send 75 soldiers with medical problems into the

Testimony of Lawrence J. Korb
House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2007

war zone. These include troops with serious injuries and other medical problems, including GIs who doctors have said are medically unfit for battle. Medical records show that some are too injured to wear their body armor.

This lack of “dwell time” is also taking its toll on morale. Multiple tours and expedited or extended deployments have wreaked havoc in the personal lives of those in uniform, as well as on their families. An Army Survey revealed that soldiers are 50 percent more likely to suffer from acute combat stress, which increases the risk of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), if they serve more than one tour.¹⁰ Divorces, which had hovered in the two percent to three percent range for the Army since 2000, increased in 2004 to six percent among officers and 3.6 percent among enlisted personnel.¹¹

Since the 2003 invasion, the suicide rate among troops deployed for the Iraq war reached its highest point in 2006, according to an Army mental health study.¹² Sometimes the trigger is news of a second or third deployment. Last Christmas, for example, Army Reservist James Dean, who had already served in Afghanistan for 18 months and had been diagnosed with PTSD, was notified that his unit would be sent to Iraq in three weeks on January 14. According to news reports, Dean barricaded himself in his father’s home with several weapons and threatened to kill himself. After a 14-hour standoff with authorities, Dean was killed by a police officer after he aimed a gun at another officer. As Steve Robinson the Director of Veterans Affairs at Veterans for America explained, “We call that suicide by cop.”¹³

As Lieutenant General William Odom notes,

No U.S. forces have ever been compelled to stay in sustained combat conditions for as long as the Army units have in Iraq. In World War II, soldiers were

¹⁰ Ann Scott Tyson, “Repeat Iraq tours raise risk of PTSD, Army finds,” *The Washington Post*, December 20, 2006.

¹¹ Lizette Alvarez, “Long Iraq Tours Can Make Home a Trying Front,” *New York Times*, February 23, 2007.

¹² Gregg Zoroya, “Suicide Rate Spikes Among Troops Sent to Iraq War,” *USA Today*, December 19, 2006.

¹³ Aaron Glantz, “Iraq Vets Left in Physical and Mental Agony,” *Inter Press Service*, January 4, 2007.

Testimony of Lawrence J. Korb
House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2007

considered combat-exhausted after about 180 days in the line. They were withdrawn for rest periods. Moreover, for weeks at a time, large sectors of the front were quiet, giving them time for both physical and psychological rehabilitation...

In Iraq combat units take over an area of operations and patrol it daily, making soldiers face the prospect of death from an IED or small arms fire or mortar fire several hours each day. Day in and day out for a full year, with only a single two-week break, they confront the prospect of death, losing limbs or eyes, or suffering other serious wounds... The impact on the psyche accumulates, eventually producing what is now called "post traumatic stress disorder." In other words, they are combat-exhausted to the point of losing effectiveness. The occasional willful killing of civilians in a few cases is probably indicative of such loss of effectiveness. These incidents don't seem to occur during the first half of a unit's deployment.¹⁴

Impact on the Ground Forces.

The strain on personnel and the difficulty of recruiting new soldiers in the midst of an unpopular war has forced the Army to relax many of its standards for enlistment and reenlistment and dramatically increase enlistment and recruitment bonuses. These steps will have a long term impact on the Army.

After failing to meet its recruitment target for 2005, the Army raised the maximum age for enlistment from 35 to 40 in January 2006—only to find it necessary to raise it to 42 in June. Basic training, an essential tool for developing and training new recruits, has increasingly become a rubber-stamping ritual. Through the first six months of 2006, only 7.6 percent of new recruits flunked out of basic training, down from 18.1 percent in May 2005.

¹⁴ William Odom, "Supporting the Troops Means Withdrawing Them, *Nieman Watchdog*, July 5, 2007

Testimony of Lawrence J. Korb
House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2007

Alarmingly, this drop in basic training attrition coincides with a dramatic lowering of recruitment standards. The number of Army recruits who scored below average on its aptitude test doubled in 2005, and the Army has doubled the number of non-high school graduates it enlisted last year. In 2006, only 81 percent of the new enlistees had high school diplomas, compared to 94 percent before the invasion. Even as more allowances are made, the Government Accountability Office reported that allegations and substantiated claims of recruiter wrongdoing have increased by 50 percent. Last May, for example, the Army signed up an autistic man to become a cavalry scout.

The number of criminal offenders that the Army has allowed in the military—through the granting of “moral waivers” —has also increased significantly. Last year, such waivers were granted to 8,129 men and women—or more than one out of every 10 new Army recruits. That number is up 65 percent since 2003, the year President Bush ordered the invasion of Iraq. This year the situation is even worse. Through the first three quarters of FY 2007, waivers for criminal convictions have risen to 12 percent. In the last three years, more than 125,000 moral waivers have been granted by America’s four military services. A senior NCO involved in recruiting summarized the situation well when he told *The New York Times* on April 9, 2007, “We’re enlisting more dropouts, people with more law violations, lower test scores, more moral issues... We’re really scraping the bottom of the barrel to get people to join.” Private Steven Green, the soldier arrested for his alleged role in the rape of an Iraqi girl and the murder of her family, was allowed to join the Army upon being granted one such moral waiver. Green had legal, educational, and psychological problems, didn’t graduate from high school and had been arrested several times.

Many of last year’s Army waivers were for serious misdemeanors, like aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, and vehicular homicide. But around 900—double the number in 2003—were for felonies. Worse, the Army does no systematic tracking of recruits with waivers once it signs them up, and it does not always pay enough attention to any adjustment problems.

Testimony of Lawrence J. Korb
House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2007

Overall enlisted retention numbers are adequate. But the Army is keeping its numbers up by increasing financial incentives and allowing soldiers to reenlist early, that is with more than one year left on their current enlistment. Moreover, first term retention for soldiers is off by seven percent.

There are problems with retention in the officer corps as well. Retention among West Point graduates is at its lowest point in 30 years and consequently the Army only has half of the senior Captains it needs. Additionally, the Army's personnel costs continue to increase. Spending on enlistment and recruitment bonuses tripled from \$328 million before the war in Iraq to over \$1 billion in 2006. The incentives for Army Guard and Reserve have grown ten-fold over the same period.

II. The Way Forward.

Congress Can Take Action. The Congress under the constitution is given the power to "make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." It is well within Congressional authority to regulate the deployment of U.S. military personnel. According to your Congressional Research Service:

As a matter of historical practice, Congress has occasionally imposed limitations and other requirements on the deployment of U.S. troops, including during wartime. These limitations have been effectuated either through the statutory prohibition on the use of military personnel for a particular purpose, or via the denial of appropriations in support

Examples of past action according to CRS:¹⁵

- 1915 in the Philippines: Congress restricted tours of duty to two years.

¹⁵ Congressional Research Service

Testimony of Lawrence J. Korb
House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2007

- 1951 during the Korean War: Congress passed the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, which required that active duty personnel receive at least four months of training before being deployed.
- 1985 concerning U.S. forces deployed to NATO countries: stipulated that U.S. force levels should not be higher than 326,414.

Congress should ensure that U.S. forces receive adequate dwell time. Congress should ensure that those who serve get at least an equal amount of time at home as they spend in the combat zone. We have been at war for more than four years in Iraq. We owe it not just to those serving, but to their families as well, to provide them with some stability and to ensure they receive adequate time at home between deployments. Failing to ensure even this minimum amount of dwell time is doing a disservice to our troops. Similarly, Guard and Reserve troops should not be deployed unless they have spent three years at home.

Therefore it is imperative that Congress pass the bill introduced by Congresswoman Tauscher, with the support of other member especially Congressman Price, and the Amendment offered by Chairman Skelton. The bill stipulates that troops that are deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan should receive dwell time that is at least equal or longer than the time that that was spent deployed and that Guard and Reserve units cannot be redeployed if they have deployed at any time during the last three years. Since this bill already relaxes the Pentagon policy of two years dwell time for active duty personnel and no more than one deployment for every five years for Guard and Reserve troops, and provides for a Presidential waiver, it is hard to see why anyone would be opposed. This bill will help protect our ground forces from breaking.

Adopt a Strategy of Strategic Reset. Last month, the Center released its new Iraq policy report, Strategic Reset. The report recognizes that the even with the surge Iraqi government is not meeting its benchmarks, overall violence in the country is not

Testimony of Lawrence J. Korb
House Armed Services Committee, July 27, 2007

declining, and U.S. security is being jeopardized by our continuing large scale presence in Iraq. It therefore calls for the phased redeployment of all U.S. troops from Iraq within twelve months. At the same time, we argue that we must recognize the reality of Iraq's political fragmentation by ending the unconditional training and equipping of Iraq's security forces and shift our reconstruction, governance, and security assistance to localities and regions where it is practical and possible to do so. As we redeploy from Iraq into the region, we will need to initiate a broader regional diplomatic effort to contain Iraq's multiple internal conflicts. We must therefore work with Iraq's neighbors and form working groups on various issues of concern, such as terrorism, refugees, and security. Talking to Iraq's neighbors means talking to our adversaries in Syria and Iran, using the same tough approach we used to deal with the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War. More broadly, the United States needs to develop a strategy to contain and ultimately resolve the conflicts throughout the Middle East – especially the Arab-Israeli conflict. We should appoint a special Middle East envoy to work on the problem, with support from two senior ambassadors, to work on both the Arab-Israeli conflict and Iraq's internal conflicts.

It is imperative that the U.S. take control of its own security and begin planning for a phased redeployment of its forces now. The Tanner-Abercrombie Bill which requires the administration to develop a comprehensive redeployment plan is a necessary first step in that direction and should be adopted.

Twenty-six years ago I was fortunate enough to be confirmed to assume responsibility for the readiness of the Armed Forces. Because of Vietnam and its immediate aftermath, this nation had what the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army called a "hollow army." With the help of Congress, and in particular this committee, we were able to reverse this situation. Successive administrations and Congresses continued to maintain the quality of the force. It is hard to believe that the Bush administration has allowed the readiness of our ground forces to deteriorate so rapidly in so short a time. Therefore Congress and this committee must take the initiative in fixing the problem. The bills you are considering will move us in that direction.

Lawrence J. Korb

Lawrence J. Korb is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and a Senior Adviser to the Center for Defense Information. Prior to joining the Center, he was a Senior Fellow and Director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. From July 1998 to October 2002, he was Council Vice President, Director of Studies, and holder of the Maurice Greenberg Chair. Prior to joining the Council, Mr. Korb served as Director of the Center for Public Policy Education and Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, Dean of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, and Vice President of Corporate Operations at the Raytheon Company.

Mr. Korb served as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Logistics) from 1981 through 1985. In that position, he administered about 70 percent of the Defense budget. For his service in that position, he was awarded the Department of Defense's medal for Distinguished Public Service. Mr. Korb served on active duty for four years as Naval Flight Officer, and retired from the Naval Reserve with the rank of Captain.

Mr. Korb's 20 books and more than 100 articles on national security issues include *The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-five Years*, *The Fall and Rise of the Pentagon*, *American National Security: Policy and Process*, *Future Visions for U.S. Defense Policy*, *Reshaping America's Military*, and *A New National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass Destruction*. His articles have appeared in such journals as *Foreign Affairs*, *Public Administration Review*, *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, *Naval Institute Proceedings*, and *International Security*. Over the past decade, Mr. Korb has made over 1,000 appearances as a commentator on such shows as *The Today Show*, *The Early Show*, *Good Morning America*, *Face the Nation*, *This Week with David Brinkley*, *MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour*, *News Hour with Jim Lehrer*, *Nightline*, *60 Minutes*, *Larry King Live*, *The O'Reilly Factor*, and *Crossfire*. His more than 100 op-ed pieces have appeared in such major newspapers as the *Washington Post*, *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Washington Times*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Boston Globe*, *Baltimore Sun*, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, and *Christian Science Monitor*.

Books by Lawrence J. Korb:

A New National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Three Options Presented as Presidential Speeches

Reshaping America's Military: Four Alternatives Presented as Presidential Speeches

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 27, 2007

**AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R. 3159
OFFERED BY MR. SKELTON OF MISSOURI**

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the “Ensuring Military
3 Readiness Through Stability and Predictability Deploy-
4 ment Policy Act of 2007”.

**5 SEC. 2. MINIMUM PERIODS OF REST AND RECUPERATION
6 FOR UNITS OF THE ARMED FORCES BE-
7 TWEEN DEPLOYMENTS.**

8 (a) REGULAR COMPONENTS.—

9 (1) IN GENERAL.—No unit of the Armed
10 Forces specified in paragraph (3) may be deployed
11 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom unless the
12 period between the most recent previous deployment
13 of the unit and a subsequent deployment of the unit
14 is equal to or longer than the period of such most
15 recent previous deployment.

16 (2) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON OPTIMAL MINIMUM
17 PERIOD BETWEEN DEPLOYMENTS.—It is the sense
18 of Congress that the optimal minimum period be-

1 tween the most recent previous deployment of a unit
2 of the Armed Forces specified in paragraph (3) and
3 a subsequent deployment of the unit in support of
4 Operation Iraqi Freedom should be equal to or
5 longer than twice the period of such most recent
6 previous deployment.

7 (3) COVERED UNITS.—Subject to subsection
8 (e), the units of the Armed Forces specified in this
9 paragraph are as follows:

10 (A) Units of the regular Army and mem-
11 bers assigned to those units.

12 (B) Units of the regular Marine Corps and
13 members assigned to those units.

14 (C) Units of the regular Navy and mem-
15 bers assigned to those units.

16 (D) Units of the regular Air Force and
17 members assigned to those units.

18 (b) RESERVE COMPONENTS.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—No unit of the Armed
20 Forces specified in paragraph (3) may be deployed
21 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom if the unit
22 has been deployed in support of Operation Iraqi
23 Freedom at any time within the three years pre-
24 ceding the date of the proposed deployment.

1 (2) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MOBILIZATION
2 AND OPTIMAL MINIMUM PERIOD BETWEEN DEPLOY-
3 MENTS.—It is the sense of Congress that the units
4 of the reserve components of the Armed Forces
5 should not be mobilized continuously for more than
6 one year, and the optimal minimum period between
7 the previous deployment of a unit of the Armed
8 Forces specified in paragraph (3) and a subsequent
9 deployment of the unit in support of Operation Iraqi
10 Freedom should be five years.

11 (3) COVERED UNITS.—The units of the Armed
12 Forces specified in this paragraph are as follows:

13 (A) Units of the Army Reserve and mem-
14 bers assigned to those units.

15 (B) Units of the Army National Guard and
16 members assigned to those units.

17 (C) Units of the Marine Corps Reserve and
18 members assigned to those units.

19 (D) Units of the Navy Reserve and mem-
20 bers assigned to those units.

21 (E) Units of the Air Force Reserve and
22 members assigned to those units.

23 (F) Units of the Air National Guard and
24 members assigned to those units.

1 (c) EXEMPTIONS.—The limitations in subsections (a)
2 and (b) do not apply—

3 (1) to special operations forces as identified
4 pursuant to section 167(i) of title 10, United States
5 Code; and

6 (2) to units of the Armed Forces needed , as
7 determined by the Secretary of Defense, to assist in
8 the redeployment of members of the Armed Forces
9 from Iraq to another operational requirement or
10 back to their home stations.

11 (d) WAIVER BY THE PRESIDENT.—The President
12 may waive the limitation in subsection (a) or (b) with re-
13 spect to the deployment of a unit of the Armed Forces
14 to meet a threat to the national security interests of the
15 United States if the President certifies to Congress within
16 30 days that the deployment of the unit is necessary for
17 such purposes.

18 (e) WAIVER BY MILITARY CHIEF OF STAFF OR COM-
19 MANDANT FOR VOLUNTARY MOBILIZATIONS.—

20 (1) ARMY.—With respect to the deployment of
21 a member of the Army who has voluntarily re-
22 quested mobilization, the limitation in subsection (a)
23 or (b) may be waived by the Chief of Staff of the
24 Army.

1 (2) NAVY.—With respect to the deployment of
2 a member of the Navy who has voluntarily requested
3 mobilization, the limitation in subsection (a) or (b)
4 may be waived by the Chief of Naval Operations.

5 (3) MARINE CORPS.—With respect to the de-
6 ployment of a member of the Marine Corps who has
7 voluntarily requested mobilization, the limitation in
8 subsection (a) or (b) may be waived by the Com-
9 mandant of the Marine Corps.

10 (4) AIR FORCE.—With respect to the deploy-
11 ment of a member of the Air Force who has volun-
12 tarily requested mobilization, the limitation in sub-
13 section (a) or (b) may be waived by the Chief of
14 Staff of the Air Force.

15 (f) DEFINITION OF DEPLOYMENT.—In this Act, the
16 term “deployment” or “deployed” means the relocation of
17 forces and materiel to desired areas of operations and en-
18 compasses all activities from origin or home station
19 through destination, including staging, holding, and move-
20 ment in and through the United States and all theaters
21 of operation.

22 (g) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This Act shall take effect on
23 the date of the enactment of this Act.

110TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 3087

To require the President, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior military leaders, to develop and transmit to Congress a comprehensive strategy for the redeployment of United States Armed Forces in Iraq.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 18, 2007

Mr. TANNER (for himself, Mr. ABERCROMBIE, Mrs. TAUSCHER, Mr. MEEK of Florida, Mr. DELAHUNT, Mr. COSTA, and Ms. SCHWARTZ) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services

A BILL

To require the President, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior military leaders, to develop and transmit to Congress a comprehensive strategy for the redeployment of United States Armed Forces in Iraq.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. FINDINGS.**

4 Congress finds the following:

5 (1) The Authorization for Use of Military Force
6 Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107–
7 243), enacted into law on October 16, 2002, author-

1 a comprehensive strategy for the redeployment of the
2 Armed Forces in Iraq.

3 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy re-
4 quired by subsection (a) shall include planning to achieve
5 the following:

6 (1) The transition of United States combat
7 forces from policing civil strife or sectarian violence
8 in Iraq.

9 (2) United States military operations to deny
10 international terrorists a safe haven, conduct
11 counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in Iraq
12 and other global terrorist organizations, protect the
13 Armed Forces and facilities of the Armed Forces,
14 and support and equip Iraqi forces to take full re-
15 sponsibility for their own security.

16 (3) A projection of the number of members of
17 the Armed Forces required for the missions de-
18 scribed in paragraphs (1) and (2).

19 (4) The safe redeployment of the Armed Forces
20 and the orderly removal of material, equipment, and
21 logistical requirements not needed for the missions
22 described in paragraphs (1) and (2).

1 **SEC. 3. ARMED FORCES DEFINED.**

2 In this Act, the term “Armed Forces” has the mean-
3 ing given the term in section 101 of title 10, United States
4 Code.

○

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

JULY 27, 2007

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MURPHY

Mr. MURPHY. In December, sir, you wrote in the Washington Post that: "Bringing security to Baghdad is possible only with a surge of at least 30,000 combat troops lasting 18 months or so. *Any other option is likely to fail.*" Despite the fact that my former unit, the 82nd Airborne, has been part of this most recent escalation since January, we constantly hear from my friends on the other side of the aisle that the "surge" only really went into place in June. Therefore, General Keane—from my calculation—you believe that we need to wait until January of 2009 if we are to see true progress resulting from an escalation of troops.

I therefore have two questions: (1) In light of the testimony we have heard—especially from Dr. Korb and Chairman Skelton—as to how this conflict has over-extended our Armed Forces, do you believe we could find the troops to maintain such an escalation? And a closely related follow up: (2) given that there is a near unanimity that we can't maintain such heightened troop levels—is there any point in this Congress waiting until September to act when you yourself admit that a surge of that time frame "is likely to fail."

I also want to take your arguments to their logical end. In the same article, sir, you state—"of all the 'surge' options out there, short ones are the most dangerous." So from my understanding of your logic—and if history is any guide most likely the President's—if General Petraeus reports progress in September, should the American people prepare themselves for a recommendation from this Administration that 140,000 to 150,000 troops remain in Iraq for an extended period of time?

General KEANE. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

